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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement  
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘Companies Act 2008’) brought about innovative new 
concepts into our law. Of these is business rescue, which entails the facilitation of 
rehabilitating a company that appears that it will unlikely pay its debts as they become due 
within six months or appears likely that it will become insolvent within six months.
1
 This 
provides for the temporary supervision of such a company, the temporary moratorium on the 
rights of claimants against it, and the development and implementation of a plan to 
restructure it affairs in order to either maximise its likelihood of solvency or to maximise the 
likelihood of a better return for its stakeholders than it would in liquidation.
2
 During such 
time, a business rescue practitioner (‘practitioner’) is appointed to oversee the proceedings,
3
 
who is then given the power during business rescue to entirely, partially or conditionally 
suspend any obligation of a company in business rescue, arising out of an agreement entered 
into before the proceedings, and which the obligation would otherwise become due during 
those proceedings.
4
   
This enables a practitioner to suspend a company’s repayment obligation in terms of a 
loan agreement, which in many cases ma  be secured by the registration of a mortgage bond 
in the deeds office.  In these circumstances, a practitioner’s power is exercised not only in 
respect of the contractual right, but also the underlying limited real rights. This is because 
there is an interdependent two tier legal relationship. Firstly, there is the underlying loan 
agreement in terms of which personal rights exist between a creditor and a company. 
Secondly, there is the registered mortgage bond giving rise to ancillary limited real rights 
over a company’s immovable property. This dissertation seeks to examine the legal 
consequences that flow from the suspension of such an obligation in such instances, and in 
particular whether the power is compatible with the constitutional right to property. 
  
                                                          
1
 Section 128(1)(b), read with section 128(1)(f) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Section 128(1)(d) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
4
 Section 136(2)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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1.2 Structure of the Dissertation and Outline of Analysis 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Our Deeds Registry System  
Key to the legal issue in this dissertation is that a mortgage bond is registered. It will be 
shown that history tells us that our registration system is based on the publicity principle and, 
therefore, registration is required for the creation, transfer and termination of all real rights in 
immovable property. 
This chapter forms an important theoretical foundation, which explores the history of 
our deeds registration system, ultimately highlighting the significance of registration. It will 
be seen later that real rights in a mortgage bond vest immediately at the time of registration. 
As such, it is very useful to have a deep understanding of our registration system so that in 
later chapters it can be determined whether a practitioner’s power can legally affect registered 
real rights. 
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Defining and Distinguishing between Personal Rights and Real Rights 
To understand the legal nature of the obligation that a practitioner is able to suspend during 
business rescue, one needs to differentiate between the rights enjoyed by a creditor in a loan 
agreement and the rights enjoyed in a mortgage bond and draw specific distinctions between 
these rights. 
It will be shown later that when a creditor has an enforceable claim against a debtor in 
terms of a loan agreement, it is in a creditor’s personal capacity. On the other hand, rights 
enjoyed by a creditor in a mortgage bond are so enjoyed in relation to the secured property 
only. The basis of these rights is, however, in relation to the underlying claim. As such, it is 
important to differentiate between personal rights and real rights so as to later understand 
how they interplay between the two. This chapter will focus specifically on drawing this 
distinction by critically defining what personal and real rights are, and indicating how the 
courts have used accepted principles to draw the distinction. 
1.2.3 Chapter 4: Critical Analysis of a Mortgage Bond 
When a creditor seeks to secure a claim a debtor would normally provide real security, which 
entails that a creditor enjoys certain rights over property belonging to a debtor. A mortgage is 
a specific category of real security, which is distinguishable from others in that it is only 
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obtained upon registration. To physically register a mortgage, a mortgage bond attested by 
the registrar, specially hypothecating immovable property, would be registered.  
It will be seen herein that upon registration, limited real rights in the immovable 
property of a debtor vest in a creditor which include restraining its alienation, the right to 
seek an execution order and claiming preference in its proceeds upon its sale in insolvency. It 
will be shown in this chapter that these limited real rights are ancillary in nature and cannot 
be separated from the underlying claim. 
1.2.4 Chapter 5: The Extent of the Business Rescue Practitioner’s Power to Suspend Rights 
The enabling suspension provision
 
in section 136(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2008 appears to 
be modelled on Chapter 11 of the United States of America Bankruptcy code. The provision 
in its current form was not without controversy and amendments before it actually came into 
effect. In this chapter we will look at the legislative history of the provision and do a 
comparative analysis with its United States counterpart. 
After having understood the significance of registration, the purpose of this chapter is 
to determine the exact extent of the power of a practitioner to suspend any obligation. On 
face value, the power of a practitioner to suspend is limited to personal rights of a creditor. 
However, because of the two legal tier relationship, this may not necessarily be the case. It is 
in this chapter that it will be determined whether the power to suspend any obligation 
includes rights flowing from a mortgage bond. 
If indeed the power to suspend extends to rights enjoyed in a mortgage bond, then the 
question arises whether there should be some form of registration to note the suspension of 
these rights. In order to determine whether we can learn anything from the United States 
registration system in this regard, it will be beneficial to first compare their system with ours. 
1.2.5 Chapter 6: The Right to Property 
Section 25(1) (‘property clause’) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(‘Constitution’) provides that no person may be deprived of property except in terms of law 
of general application and such law may not permit arbitrary deprivation. In order to 
determine whether section 136(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2008 offends the property clause, 
this chapter will unpack the property clause and determine, firstly, what constitutes property, 
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secondly, what constitutes deprivation, and lastly what would amount to arbitrary deprivation 
of property in terms of the Constitution. 
1.3 Methodology 
The principles discussed in chapters 2 to 4 have their origin in common law and, therefore, 
reliance will be placed on case law and published textbooks in the field of property law. 
Common law principles in case law develop over time and so court cases will be, far as 
possible, chronologically discussed as they were decided.   
Chapters 2 to 4 lay the theoretical foundation and form the basis of chapter 5, which 
takes out all the key principles derived from chapters 2 to 4 to determine the exact extent of 
the power of a practitioner to suspend rights.  
Chapter 6 tests the constitutionality of section 136(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2008 
against the property clause by dividing  issues into little components. Each component is 
looked at by firstly discussing the law and then applying the law to each component 
accordingly.  
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CHAPTER 2: OUR DEEDS REGISTRY SYSTEM  
A mortgage bond is always seen in relation to ownership of land, in respect of which it will 
later be seen that publicly has become the best form of legitimising and protecting ownership. 
This today manifests itself in the form of registration in the deeds office and as such, any 
right or burden relating to ownership comes about publicly. A mortgage bond is nothing more 
than a burden or curtailment of ownership and it follows that the consequences of curtailment 
in ownership follow on registration. This is all confirmed in the historical development of our 
registration system, which reads somewhat like an adventure themed book, set in the times of 
empires attempting to expand their territories. 
2.1 Historical Background 
In ancient times ownership of both movables and land could be maintained only by the 
continued possession of might.
5
 However, with the development of civilised conditions some 
method of establishing proof of ownership was necessary in the event of a dispute.
6
 Land 
surveying is one such method, which can be traced as far back as the history of the Egyptian 
people who have a civilisation that is thousands of years old.
7
  If one looks at their history, a 
system for the transfer of ownership similar to our system existed there in 300BC.
8
 
Interestingly enough, this system can also be traced in biblical times as recorded in the Bible. 
Jeremiah 32:9-14
9
 gives us an indication that during that time there was a system for the 
                                                          
5 WV der Beer & RF Rorke Newall’s Law and Practice of Deeds Registration 2ed (1964) 1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Maxwell ‘History of Land Surviving’, 10 0ctober 2011, available at  http://www.maxwell-land-
surveying.com/history-land-surveving, accessed on 13 July 2013; see also Wikepedia regarding Surveying, 
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:RekonDog/Surveying, accessed on 14 July 2013, where it is said 
that when the Nile River overflowed its banks and washed out farms and homes boundaries were re-established 
by a rope stretcher, through the application of simple geometry. The nearly perfect squareness and north-south 
orientation of the Great Pyramid of Giza, built circa 2700, affirm the Egyptians' command of surveying. 
8 AS West The Practitioner’s Guide to Conveyancing and Notarial Practice consulta 16 2ed (2009) 1; see also 
L Duhaime ‘Land Titles | Beginner's Guide to the Law Behind the Official Registration of Land Ownership’, 13 
August 2012,  available at http://www.duhaime.org/LegalResources/RealEstateTenancy/LawArticle-1432/Land-
Titles-Beginners-Guide-to-the-Law-Behind-the-Official-Registration-of-Land-Ownership.aspx  , accessed on 13 
July 2013, where it is said that official records of land ownership date 3000 BC, where in ancient Egypt rulers 
kept a royal registry to record land ownership for taxation purposes. 
9 ‘9 so I bought the field at Anathoth from my cousin Hanamel and weighed out for him seventeen shekels of 
silver. 10 I signed and sealed the deed, had it witnessed, and weighed out the silver on the scales. 11 I took the 
deed of purchase--the sealed copy containing the terms and conditions, as well as the unsealed copy-- 12 and I 
gave this deed to Baruch son of Neriah, the son of Mahseiah, in the presence of my cousin Hanamel and of the 
witnesses who had signed the deed and of all the Jews sitting in the courtyard of the guard. 13 In their presence I 
gave Baruch these instructions: 14 “This is what the LORD Almighty, the God of Israel, says: Take these 
documents, both the sealed and unsealed copies of the deed of purchase, and put them in a clay jar so they will 
last a long time.”’ 
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transfer of land relating to the formalities in respect of registering a deed of transfer, which is 
comparable to our system as it exists today.
10
 
2.1.1 The Dutch system of land ownership 
Our system of ownership of land as it exists today was foreign to the indigenous inhabitants 
of South Africa, who were nomadic tribes whose custom recognised that land within the area 
of a tribe vested in the tribe and not individuals.
11
 It is the earliest colonists and merchants 
who brought with them to South Africa the Dutch version of the European legal tradition that 
recognised and upheld private individual ownership of land.
12
 Separate elements of the 
Roman law and Germanic customary law within the Dutch legal tradition gave effect to the 
publicity principle underlying ownership and subsequent transfer of land.
13
 In Roman law, 
land had to be transferred by mere “delivery”.
14
 On the other hand, Germa ic law transfer of 
land involved more formalities and greater adherence to the publicity principles, such as a 
declaration by the transferor of the intention to transfer land in the presence of witnesses.
15
 
However, as time progressed formalities were made official and transfer of land had to take 
place before the court of the place where the land was situated.
16
 This principle was made of 
general application in Holland when Emperor Charles V issued a placaat in 1529,
17
 in terms 
of which every sale or hypothecation of land was required to take place before a judge.
18
 Any 
sale of land contrary to the placaat was null and void.
19
 This was reinforced by Emperor 
Phillip II when he issued a placaat in Holland around 1560, stating that the secretary of each 
city had to keep a register of all sales and taxation of land.
20
 The effect of this placaat was 
that in Holland transfer of land and the transfer and creation of any other rights to land had to 
be registered.
21
 
  
                                                          
10
 AS West op cit (n8) 1. 
11
 RJM Jones & HS Nel Conveyancing in South Africa 4ed (1991) 3. 
12
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar, H Mostert & M van Rooyen Silberg & Schoeman’s Law of Property 4ed (2003) 
190. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 191. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 3. 
19
 AS West op cit (n8) 1. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
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2.1.2 The introduction of the Dutch system of transfer of land to South Africa 
History of colonisation and expansion northwards in South Africa determined the underlying 
principles of our system of registration.
22
 The provisions of the placaaten by Emperors 
Charles V and Phillip II were incorporated into the laws of the Cape through enactment and 
extensions in the Political Ordinance of April 1580 and sections of a placaat issued by 
Holland on 22 December 1598.
23
 Even though these provisions were first issued into the 
Cape for taxation purposes only,
24
 the incorporation of the placaaten saw the establishment of 
some form of land registration in the Cape. It is said that land registration in South Africa 
began with the issue of two freehold grants of land in the Liesbeek Valley of Rondebosch
25
 
and thereafter twenty-two transfers as well as twenty-one bonds were registered by around 
that time.
26
 Prior to this, however, there was no actual registration of title in South Africa.
27
 
This led to Simon van der Stel, the Governor of the Cape Colony, issuing a resolution and 
proclamation in 1686 whereby all registration of land was made obligatory.
28
 Land owners 
were given two months to register their title, failing which they forfeited their right to the 
land.
29
 The transfer of land had to be effected before judges, but in order to make the transfer 
secure, an interval of a year and a day had to lapse, after the transfer was acknowledged, 
without any claim to the land being made by anyone else.
30
 In South Africa there were no 
judges at the time and so two commissioners were appointed by the Court of Justice.
31
 The 
commissioners executed deeds, and later executed deeds in the presence of the colonial 
secretary until 1828.
32
 
2.1.3 Registration of mortgage bonds. 
The resolution and proclamation of van der Stel did not make for the registration of mortgage 
bonds and all that was required was for mortgage bonds to be executed before the 
commissioners of justice.
33
 In 1714, a placaat was issued whereby all mortgage bonds also 
had to be submitted for proper registration, failing which bondholders lost the preference that 
                                                          
22
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 3. 
23
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 191. 
24
 WV der Beer & RF Rorke op cit (n1) 3. 
25
 G Denoon ‘The Development of Methods of Land Registration in South Africa’ (1943) 60 SALJ 179. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 AS West op cit (n8) 1. 
28
 Ibid 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 G Denoon op cit (n25) 182. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 3. 
33
 AS West op cit (n8) 1. 
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they were afforded against other creditors.
34
 Sale of land very often took place on credit, for 
which mortgage bonds were passed.
35
 The mortgage bonds hardly exceeded one page and 
were not endorsed against the title deeds of the property concerned.
36
 The lack of 
endorsement against title deeds and a register that did not contain a concise summary of the 
registration history contributed to insecurity and uncertainty regarding ownership and 
mortgaging of land.
37
 Reforms were introduced gradually to remedy this, but it was only 
under British rule that the most serious shortcomings in the registration system were 
rectified.
38
  
2.1.4 The introduction of cadastral survey in South Africa 
An efficient system of registration of title of land and registration of rights in land is 
impossible unless each registered unit of land is surveyed and represented on a diagram or 
general plan.
39
 It is under the British rule that cadastral survey as the basis of the present 
registration system in South Africa was introduced.
40
 Land surveying commenced with the 
advent of British settlement in the Cape around 1813.
41
 There were diagrams annexed to 
grants of farms prior to the introduction of the cadastral system, but these diagrams were 
mere sketch plans.
42
 It was only from 1813 that the sketch plans were replaced by grants with 
diagrams based on survey.
43
 In 1813 Sir John Cradock, Governor of the Cape Colony, issued 
a proclamation which provided that land held under grants with sketch plans prior to 1813 
had to be resurveyed and the grants reissued.
44
 
2.1.5 The introduction of the registrar of deeds in South Africa. 
From the beginning of 1823 English replaced Dutch as the official language and the 
commissioners were assembled at the office of the chief secretary under the Court of 
Justice,
45
 but the office was abolished with the establishment of the Supreme Court and it was 
                                                          
34
 Ibid. 
35
 AS West op cit (n8) 2. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 1. 
40
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
41
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 3. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
45
 G Denoon op cit (n25) 182. 
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considered necessary to appoint a registrar of deeds.
46
 Ordinance No. 39 of 1828 was issued, 
which provided for the preparation, execution and registration of deeds of transfer and 
mortgage bonds.
47
 It is for this purpose that the office of the registrar of deeds was instituted 
and took over the responsibility of the commissioners and secretary.
48
 The first registrar of 
deeds was also the registrar of slaves and deeds in Cape Town.
49
 Initially, the registrar was 
responsible for the preparation of transport deeds,
50
 but as a result of vast expenses which 
were incurred with building of roads, an investigation was held to curb expenses where 
possible.
51
 Clerks in the deeds office who were responsible for the preparation of deeds were 
dismissed at work in terms of Ordinance No. 14 of 1844 and the work was afforded to 
advocates.
52
 This was the start of the office of the conveyancer as we know it today.
53
 It was 
only later that qualified conveyancers were employed for purposes of preparing deeds,
54
 after 
passing a qualification exam set by the Supreme Court.
55
 Although deeds were prepared in 
the deeds office, conveyancers soon monopolised the preparation of all deeds and this gave 
rise to the regular and methodical examination of deeds by staff in the deeds office.
56
  
2.1.6 The land register 
The dismissal of clerks in 1844 saw the land register being established in that same year.
57
 It 
consisted of a series of consecutive entries in chronological order of details in deeds of 
transfer.
58
 The purpose of the land register is given in Houtpoort Mining and Estate 
Syndicate, Ltd v Jacobs
59
  where Wessels J, at 108-109, held that:  
‘[t]he can therefore be but little doubt that…registration…was for the purpose of 
publicity, partly that land should not be sold twice over to different purchasers, and 
partly so that persons who had and claim upon the land might assert these claims 
before the purchaser took possession.’ 
                                                          
46
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 3. 
47
 AS West op cit (n8) 2. 
48
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
49
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 3. 
50
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
51
 AS West op cit (n8) 2. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
55
 RJM Jones & HS Nel op cit (n11) 4. 
56
 AS West op cit (n8) 2. 
57
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 192. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 1904 TS 105. 
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The land register was the only public source of information with regards to registration of 
land and mortgage bonds and thus: 
‘[t]he only registration which our law and practice recognises as binding upon third 
parties is the registration upon the Land Register against the title of the property...’
60
 
What is binding on third parties are real rights, because if we have: 
‘…regard the origin of registration in Holland and its subsequent adoption at the 
Cape…, we must be convinced that the Land Register was only used to record real 
rights.’
61
 
Therefore, there can be no recordation of real rights outside the land register
62
 and it follows 
that any rights affecting land ought to be recorded in the land register to be binding on third 
parties. 
2.1.7 Uniformity  
The Deeds Registries Act 19 of 1891 provided for procedures which had to be followed for 
acceptance of deeds of transfer and mortgage bonds for registration in the deeds office of 
Cape Town.
63
 The procedure was transplanted partially in other areas of the country, and 
after the creation of the Union in 1910 a movement towards a uniform system of registration 
was initiated.
64
 The enactment of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 (‘Deeds Registries Act 
of 1937’) and its subsequent amendment largely ensured uniformity in this regard.
65
  
2.2 Our Deeds Registry System  
In terms of section 16 of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937, ownership of land may be 
conveyed from one person to another only by means of a deed of transfer. Section 16 further 
provides that other real rights in land shall be conveyed from one person to another by a deed 
of cession attested by a notary, but notarial cession will not be necessary in respect of 
conveyance of real rights acquired in a mortgage bond. The main mechanism of section 16 is 
to ensure sufficient publicity in the context of land title.
66
 Thus in terms of section 16, the 
South African registration system is, to a large extent, based on the registration of deeds.
67
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Registration of deeds in its simple form usually implies that deeds are registered at face value 
and that a registered deed does not necessarily serve as conclusive proof of a person’s 
ownership to land or other real rights.
68
 The registration authorities are usually not prepared 
to guarantee the accuracy of registered details, but the procedure has been refined so that it 
provides security.
69
   
2.2.1 Characteristic of our system of registration  
We differentiate between two land registration systems, namely negative system being the 
registration of deeds and positive system being the registration of title.
70
 Where a system of 
registration of deeds prevails, the deeds are registered at face value and the title is not 
guaranteed.
71
 The correctness of the registered information is not guaranteed, because the 
land register can be incomplete or incorrect,
72
 due to the possibility of some statutory forms 
of acquisition of ownership and some rights affecting third parties not being published in the 
land register.
73
 The registration system of the Netherlands is an example of a system of 
registration of deeds, which generally provides a fairly complete picture of rights in land but 
are incorrect or incomplete in a number of cases.
74
 
In terms of the system of registration of title, the identity of land is specific and 
indisputable and the title is guaranteed.
75
  There is security, completeness of records and 
protection persons who have rights in land.
76
 The Torrrens system, operating in a number of 
jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand, is an example of a system of registration of 
title.
77
 Under this system, land cannot be disposed of in any way other than by transfer and 
registration.
78
 
                                                          
68
 CR van der Walt & GJ Pienaar op cit (n67) 137. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 AS West op cit (n8) 3. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 CR van der Walt & GJ Pienaar op cit (n67) 138. 
73
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 213. 
74
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 214. 
75
 AS West op cit (n8) 3. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 PJ Badenhorst et al op cit (n12) 215. 
78
 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
17 
 
  
It is difficult to classify the South African registration system either as absolutely a 
system of registration of deeds or a system of registration of title.
79
 Our system of registration 
possesses characteristics of both systems of registration of deeds and registration of title. 
It contains characteristics of a system of registration of title in that the Deeds 
Registries Act of 1937 imposes a duty on the registrar to keep land registers, containing the 
necessary particulars for purposes of maintaining an efficient registration system.
80
 The Act 
also imposes a duty on the registrar to examine all deeds and other documents submitted to 
the registrar’s office for registration.
81
 Furthermore, the principle on which our system rest 
provides that only a registered owner, in whose name the title must be registered, or his 
nominee may convey rights in land.
82
 This is further supported by the principle that each 
owner or holder of a right in land remains the owner or the holder until registration, or a court 
order providing otherwise, or dispossession by operation of law.
83
 
On the other hand, our system contains characteristics of a system of registration of 
deeds in that there are several ways by which real rights can pass without the deeds records 
being simultaneously amended.
84
 The best known examples would be instances of acquisitive 
prescription or marriage in community of property, where the registered deeds to do not 
reflect the passing of ownership.
85
 In all other instances, ownership of land will pass by 
delivery in the form of registration, pursuant to an agreement reflecting the parties’ intention 
to give and receive ownership.
86
 As such, there can be no guarantee of the validity of a title in 
a system that takes into account intentions of the parties.
87
 Beyond ownership, the office of 
the registrar of deeds is not liable for any mistakes regarding registration, except in the case 
of bad faith or malicious acts resulting in damages.
88
 This gives room for the office of the 
registrar of deeds in certain instances to make mistakes without being held liable. 
Registration of deeds and registration of title cannot, however, be regarded as two 
separate and distinct system of which are mutually exclusive.
89
 As such, it can be said that the 
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South African land registration system is a unique system which is ultimately a combination 
of both systems.
90
  
2.2.2 Effect of registration 
Transfer of ownership of movable objects takes place only if the object is delivered to the 
new owner.
91
 In the case of immovable property, transfer takes place by means of 
registration, which is a manifestation of the common law requirement that publicity must be 
given to transfer of ownership.
92
 The application of the publicity principle entails that 
registration is required for the creation, transfer and termination of all real rights in 
immovable property.
93
 However, some authors believe that holders of real rights are 
protected not because of registration per se, but because a real right has been created, 
registration simply having been one of the requirements for the creation.
94
 It is submitted that 
this is true with regards to real rights of ownership, because a person can acquire real rights 
without registration like, for example, acquisitive prescription or marriage in community of 
property. However, same cannot be true with regards to real rights in a mortgage bond, 
because such rights, as will be seen later, only come about at registration with no exception. 
The whole idea of registration is in essence publicity and centralisation in the deeds 
registry as affording notice to the world.
95
 In Frye's (Pty) Ltd v Ries,
96
 the Appellate Division 
gave an interesting account of the effect of registration. Giving judgement for the majority, at 
583A-E, Hoexter JA held that with regard to the effect of registration:  
‘…there is no doubt that the ownership of a real right is adequately protected by its 
registration in the Deeds Office. Indeed the system of land registration was evolved 
for the very purpose of ensuring that there should not be any doubt as to the 
ownership of the persons in whose names real rights are registered. Theoretically no 
doubt the act of registration is regarded as notice to all the world of the ownership of 
the real right which is registered. That merely means that the person in whose name a 
real right is registered can prove his ownership by producing the registered deed. 
Generally speaking, no person can successfully attack the right of ownership duly and 
properly registered in the Deeds Office. If the registered owner asserts his right of 
ownership against a particular person he is entitled to do so, not because that person is 
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deemed to know that he is the owner, but because he is in fact the owner by virtue of 
the registration of his right of ownership.’ 
Our deed registry system is intended for delivery of real rights by way of publicity 
through registration. The effect of registration will be that ownership is vested and protected. 
Similarly, rights in a mortgage bond are vested and protected by virtue of registration. Upon 
registration, there will be no doubt as to the real rights registered in a person’s name. 
Registration of real rights is then notice to the whole world that a person owns the registered 
real rights. However, this does not mean that everyone is deemed to know a person is the 
owner of the registered real rights, but rather it merely means that the person can prove his 
ownership by producing the registered deeds.  
In Ex Parte Menzies Et Uxor
97
 King J considered the Appellate Division case of 
Frye's (Pty) Ltd v Ries, and in particular the passage given by Hoexter JA at 583A-E, but 
stated at 459 that:  
‘[t]he above-quoted passage is…an authoritative statement of the principle that the 
effectiveness of registered title does not rest on a legal fiction of universal knowledge 
deemed to follow from registration, but on the contrary rests in general on a valid 
registration itself. It was not, in my view, intended to mean more than that.’ 
King J’s view is that there are well recognised instances where enforceable rights of 
ownership in immovable property do arise without registration, and thus it follows logically 
that it is possible to lose enforceable rights of ownership in immovable property without 
registration, such as losing ownership through acquisitive prescription. That being the case, 
King J held that the mere fact of registration cannot be decisive. This view should, however, 
be limited to instances such as acquisitive prescription. As will be seen later, in the case of a 
mortgage bond, rights flowing therefrom cannot possibly come about other than by 
registration. 
2.2.3 Purpose and function of registration  
The court in Ridler v Gartner
98
 did not deal directly with what the purpose and function of 
registration is. Instead, the matter dealt with an action for the registration of a servitude 
against the title deeds of the purchaser of property on the ground that the purchaser had 
knowledge of the existence of the servitude. When giving judgement, Wessels J, at 260, 
captured the purpose and function of registration as follows:  
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‘[when you are] in the Deeds Office and in the Surveyor-General's Department you 
have a complete picture of the land of this country in petto. You can go to the Deeds 
Office and to the Surveyor-General's office and from the data there you can tell 
exactly what you are buying and exactly what is sold.’  
The purpose and function of our registration system is thus that people can gather any 
information relating to rights in land at the deeds office. The court, however, rejected the 
notion of doctrine of constrictive knowledge by mere registration in a public office. This 
notion is followed in the Appellate Division case of Frye's (Pty) Ltd v Ries mentioned above, 
in which Hoexter JA, at 583E-F, held that: 
‘…registration is intended to protect the real rights of those persons in whose names 
such rights are registered in the Deeds Office. It is obvious that the Deeds Office is a 
source of information concerning such rights, but the real function of registration is 
the protection of the persons in whose names real rights have been registered. Such 
rights are maintainable against the whole world...’ 
Our deeds registry system intends to protect people in whose names real rights are registered 
and as a result the deeds office functions as a source of information concerning real rights.  
King J in Ex Parte Menzies Et Uxor, at 458-460, expanded further on the purpose and 
function of registration holding that:  
‘[r]egistration…achieves the dual object of vesting the ownership and making a 
public record thereof. Where, on the other hand, according to the principles of our 
law, ownership vests in a person without [delivery], it vests without the need for 
registration. Registration in such a case would be for the nonetheless important 
purpose of public record alone.’  
Registration does not only serve to protect people in whose names real rights are registered, it 
serves a dual function of both vesting real rights and making public record of those real 
rights. In this regard, King J held that it is possible for the one function of registration, such 
as making a public record, to be separate from the other. This would be in instances of 
registration of title not requiring to be transferred, for example registration of mortgage bonds 
serving only as public record that land is encumbered. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that registration serves to protect people in 
whose name real rights are registered and thus mere registration of real rights in the deeds 
office has significant legal consequences. As such, it is important to determine what 
constitute such rights and how they are different from personal rights that arise from mere 
agreement.  
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CHAPTER 3: DEFINING AND DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PERSONAL RIGHTS 
AND REAL RIGHTS 
When a creditor has an enforceable claim against a debtor in terms of a loan agreement, it 
will be in a creditor’s personal capacity. When a mortgage bond is registered to secure the 
claim, any rights arising therefrom are in relation to the secured property only. The basis of 
these rights is, however, in relation to the underlying claim. As such, it is important to 
differentiate between personal rights and real rights so as to understand the interplay between 
the two.  
3.1 What is meant by Personal and Real Rights? 
3.1.1 Personal right 
A personal right constitutes a relationship between two or more legal subjects, the basis being 
an obligation that signifies a legal bond, by which the one is bound to pay some money to the 
other or to do or not do some act for the benefit of the other.
99
 The one party will have a right 
to a particular performance and the other party a corresponding duty to render 
performance.
100
 A relationship which confers only a moral right to performance on one party 
and imposes a reciprocal moral duty to perform is not an obligation.
101
 Performance forms an 
object of the obligation
102
 and must have economic value. A legal relationship which confers 
rights and imposes duties with no economic value is consequently not an obligation.
103
  
As an obligation is always between two or more legal subjects, is for this reason that a 
party’s right to performance is called a personal right.
104
 The close connection with a person 
distinguishes a personal right from a real right.
105
 A personal right is also called a claim, 
because it entitles the holder to claim that another person shall act in a particular manner.
106
 
A creditor who has a claim against the debtor for money lent and advanced has a right to 
compel the debtor to pay the creditor what is due, and the debtor has a legal obligation to pay 
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the creditor what is due.
 107
  The legal obligation itself does not create real rights, but the legal 
obligation is the origin of real rights.
108
 
3.1.2 Real right 
A real right primarily constitutes a relationship between a legal subject and a legal object.
109
 
A real right entails that a person has a right over an object, which can be enforced against the 
whole world.
110
  What constitutes a real right is understood in the context of distinguishing it 
from a personal right. In this regard, different theories have been developed to distinguish 
between real rights and personal rights.
111
  
3.2 Distinguishing Between Personal and Real Rights   
Two main theories have been developed concerning the theoretical distinction, namely the 
classical theory and the personalist theory.
112
 In terms of the classical theory, a real right is a 
right of a person in an object, whereas a personal right is a right of a person against 
another.
113
 In the case of a real right the object itself is the object of the right and in the case 
of a personal right the object is the obligation.
114
 On the other hand, in terms of the 
personalist theory a real right is absolute and can be enforced against anybody, whereas a 
personal right is relative and can be enforced against a specific person only.
115
 
Both the classical and the personalist theory have not provided a simple and 
consistent solution to distinguishing between personal and real rights.
116
 The reason is that 
each case will not necessarily be similar to the previous cases or follow the same logic, but is 
frequently influenced by considerations of policy.
117
 One will have to look at decided court 
cases in determining the distinction between personal and real rights. 
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3.2.1 Registrability of rights in land at common law 
A simple and consistent solution to distinguishing between personal and real rights is by way 
of determining which rights can be registered and which cannot. Our courts have held that 
real rights are rights that are enforceable against the whole world.
118
 Real right are adequately 
protected by their registration in the deeds office
119
 and in terms of common law a land 
register is used to record those rights and nothing else.
120
 Real right are therefore 
distinguishable from personal rights in that only real rights are capable of registration. Should 
a personal right be erroneously registered in the deeds office, then the registration will not 
transform it into a real right.
121
  
The requirement for the registration of real rights at common law thus provides 
guidance as to what constitute real rights and from there one will look at what makes personal 
rights not capable of registration. The matter of Ex Parte Geldenhuys
122
 determined just that 
and De Villiers JP, at 163-164, held that:  
 ‘when it is said that “personal rights” cannot be registered…, the reference is not to 
rights created in favour of a “person”, for such rights may be real rights against the 
land. The, reference is to rights, which are merely binding on the present owner of the 
land, and which thus do not bind the land…and do not bind the successors in title of 
the present owner. These are the “personal rights” which are not registrable…One has 
to look not so much to the right, but to the correlative obligation. If that obligation is a 
burden upon the land, a subtraction from the dominium, the corresponding right is 
real and registrable; if it is not such an obligation, but merely an obligation binding on 
some person or other, the corresponding right is a personal right…and it cannot as a 
rule be registered.’  
It is evident that for every right there is a correlating obligation. One has to look at the 
obligation and determine whether it places a burden on the land itself, and should it place an 
obligation that is a burden on the land, then the correlating right is real and registrable. The 
court in Lorentz v Melle
123
 has indicated that for an obligation to qualify as a burden upon the 
land, it has to be in relation to the enjoyment of land in the physical sense.
124
 However, 
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certain obligations that are not a burden on the land, but a burden on a particular person, can 
result in the registration of the correlating right if the obligations are intimately connected 
with the obligations that place an obligation on the land.
125
 
A right will be personal if a correlating obligation places an obligation that is binding 
on a particular person. Should, however, a real right be intimately linked with a personal 
right, then such a right will also be registrable. In certain instances, personal rights by their 
nature will give rise to real rights and one such instance is when a mortgage bond is to be 
registered. In Registrar of Deeds (Transvaal) Appellant v The Ferreira Deep Ltd 
Respondent
126
 De Villiers CJ, at 180, held that:  
‘[the fact that]…personal rights…are not capable of registration is a truism. The 
definition of such rights excludes their registration. But that does not apply…to 
burdens upon land, encumbrances of immovable property...They are personal until 
registration, when they become real...’  
This point will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, but it is sufficient to say here that a 
creditor only has a personal right to claim registration of a mortgage bond. It is only upon 
registration that a creditor enjoys real rights against the property of the debtor.  
3.2.2 Registrability of rights in land in terms of statute 
In terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937, no deed or condition creating 
or embodying personal rights nor any condition that does not restrict the exercise of any right 
of ownership in land shall be registrable. However, such conditions are capable of 
registration provided that deeds containing them are ancillary to a registrable condition or the 
rights contained in the deed.
127
 This does not allow the registration of personal rights, but 
merely authorises the registration of the deed that may also contains personal conditions or 
rights.
128
 It has been held that it would be dangerous and impossible to give an exhaustive 
definition of the word ‘personal’ mentioned in section 63(1), but it is quite impossible for the 
word to have had its widest meaning.
129
 Any condition restricting the exercise of a right of 
ownership in land shall be registered,
130
 but if the right is not absolute but is a relative right to 
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an object so that it can only be enforced against a determined individual, then it is a personal 
right.
131
 
Section 63(2) of the Deeds Registries Act provides that the provisions of section 63(1) 
shall not apply with reference to any condition in a mortgage bond. Conditions that do not 
restrict the exercise of any right of ownership in land embodied in a mortgage bond will not 
by registration of the mortgage bond convert them into real rights.
132
 In addition to any 
condition giving rise to real rights in the mortgage bond, any other condition may also be 
inserted, provided it is not unlawful, illegal or dishonest in that it seeks to disguise the nature 
of the mortgage bond.
133
 A registrar of deeds will determine this by examining conditions in a 
mortgage bond, as one of the duties is to examine all deeds or documents submitted for 
execution or registration.
134
 However, because of section 63(2), a registrar of deeds is not 
required to examine any provision in a mortgage bond that is not relevant to the registration 
of the mortgage bond.
135
  
3.2.3 Definition of personal and real rights in terms of statute 
There is no clarity as to what constitute personal and real rights in terms of statute. The 
matter of Odendaalsrus Gold, General Investments and Extensions Ltd v Registrar of 
Deeds
136
 noted that the Deed Registries Act of 1937 does not define the term personal rights, 
but defines a ‘real right’ as any right which becomes a real right upon registration. The court 
referred to the Registrar of Deeds v Ferreira Deep Ltd case, that held that the exclusion of a 
claim to register personal rights does not apply to personal rights that become real on 
registration, and used it as authority to decide that the definition of real rights in statute may 
refer to rights such as those in a mortgage bond that become real on registration. 
3.2.4 Intention of the parties to create real rights 
Beyond determining whether an obligation places a burden on the land itself, the intention of 
the parties will also be relevant in deciding whether a right is real or personal. In Denel (Pty) 
Ltd v Cape Explosives Works Ltd; Cape Explosives Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd
137
 Hertzberg 
J stated, at 32, that it would be easier to determine if a right is real or personal if a two stage 
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step test is applied. The first step is to determine if the obligation places a burden on the land, 
and if it is clear that it does not do so, but rather places a burden on a particular person then 
whole exercise is done. If on the other hand the right in question passes the test and is capable 
of being a real right, the next leg of the investigation is whether the parties intended for the 
right to be real. If the parties agree that the right is to be personal and not real then it is not 
registrable. 
This matter went on appeal
138
 and it would appear that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
accepted this two leg test, although it was not specifically described as such. Streicher JA 
elaborated on the test when giving judgement, at 12, by holding that to determine whether a 
particular right or condition is real, two requirements must be satisfied. The one is the 
principle that the nature of the right must place a burden on the land and the other is that:  
‘…[t]he intention of the person who creates the real right must be to bind not only the 
present owner of the land, but also his successors in title…’  
As such, although at common law the determining factor was whether an obligation places a 
burden on the land, now the requirement will also be whether a person intended for a right to 
be real. 
It is clear that an obligation that places a burden on land, coupled with the intention to 
create real rights, will result in the formation of real rights capable of registration. A burden 
that places an obligation on a particular person is regarded as a personal right belonging to 
the person entitled to performance of the obligation, and by such virtue is excluded from 
registration. Should a personal right be erroneously registered, it will not be transformed to a 
real right. Of interest, however, is that in instances of a mortgage bond, a claim for repayment 
of a loan places an obligation on a debtor and is therefore a personal right of a creditor up 
until registration when it becomes real. A mortgage bond is unique in that sense and the legal 
nature of it will be discussed next. 
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CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A MORTGAGE BOND 
A claim against a debtor may arise from a contract between the parties, a delict committed by 
the debtor against the creditor, or unjustified enrichment of the debtor at the expense of the 
creditor.
139
 Such a claim is personal in nature in that its enforcement is against the debtor in 
his or her personal capacity only.
140
 A creditor can require that the debtor provide security for 
the due performance of the claim.
141
 In this regard real security may be provided, which 
entails an asset belonging to a debtor, or to someone acting on the debtor’s behalf, being used 
as security for the satisfaction of the creditor’s claim.
142
 This provides limited real rights in 
the asset of the debtor in favour of the creditor, such rights, by their nature, seeking to convey 
a benefit with regard to the use and enjoyment of another’s asset.
143
 Various kinds of real 
security are distinguished and the most important distinction is based on the nature of the 
object of security, i.e. whether movable or immovable property.
144
 The real security focused 
on in this dissertation is of course a mortgage.  
4.1 Theoretical Distinction between a “Mortgage” and a “Mortgage Bond” 
Broadly speaking, the term “mortgage” is sometimes used to expresses a legal idea or 
employed to denote a right over the property of another, which serves to secure an 
obligation.
145
 Strictly speaking, the term is limited to describing, on the one hand, securities 
over immovable property.
146
 It is accepted today that a pledge serves to secure movable or 
incorporeal property, while a mortgage secures immovable property.
147
 
On the other hand, the t rm “mortgage bond”, strictly speaking, refers to the deed or 
an actual document, the registration of which brings about the right of mortgage.
148
 A 
mortgage bond is thus an actual instrument hypothecating immovable property in that it 
embodies a mortgage in the tangible sense. 
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4.1.1 “Mortgage” 
A mortgage grants a creditor limited real rights in the immovable property of a debtor as the 
object of security, until the principal debt has been paid in full.
149
 It has been held that:  
‘[t]he term mortgage, when used to denote a right, in its comprehensive sense, is a 
right over the property of another which serves to secure an obligation and, in its 
restrictive sense, is generally limited to describing securities over immovable 
property’.
150
  
There is always an obligation on the one hand and a right on the other. A creditor would have 
a right and a debtor a corresponding obligation and it would appear that a right and an 
obligation in this sense are inseparable.
151
 The corresponding relationship between a right and 
an obligation is essential to the existence of a mortgage. In the Appellate Division case of 
Kilburn Appellant v Estate Kilburn Respondent,
152
 Wessels ACJ, at 506, held that:  
‘[i]t is true that you can secure any obligation whether it be present or future, whether 
it be actually claimable or contingent. The security may be suspended until the 
obligation arises, but there must always be some obligation even if it be only a natural 
one to which the security obligation is accessory.’  
Thus, there must be an obligation to which the mortgage is accessory and if there is no 
obligation, there can be no mortgage.
153
 Should there not be an obligation on the part of the 
debtor giving rise to the right enjoyed by the creditor, a mortgage would fail.
154
 
The obligation may be incurred in various ways, but the most common in the 
commercial world is in the context of a loan agreement where a creditor seeks security for 
repayment of money lent and advanced or credit extended. As we moved with commercial 
times:  
‘[t]he need which was felt on the part of the owners of corporeal property to borrow 
money or obtain credit without selling their properties and the needs of moneylenders 
to obtain security for repayment of loans gave rise to the recognition of pledges of 
movable and mortgages of immovable corporeal properties.’
155
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Terms in a loan agreement are binding between a creditor and a debtor only. If the loan 
agreement includes an agreement to mortgage, the consequence is that a creditor can claim 
registration of a mortgage.
156
 This creates a personal right to claim registration, but for the 
mortgage to be effective against third parties without knowledge thereof, registration is 
essential.
157
 
4.1.2 “Mortgage bond” – registration 
The term mortgage denotes a right, but to physically bring about the right a mortgage bond 
would have to be registered in the deeds office, as the rights therein are only created upon 
registration.
158
 Leading authority in this regard is the Appellate Division case of Trustees 
Estate Chin Appellants v National Bank of South Africa Ltd Respondents.
159
 Giving judgment 
for the majority, Wessels AJA, at 367, held that registration of a mortgage is essential:  
‘…because a [mortgage] bond has only a legal effect if registered and because it dates 
from the day of its registration that an equitable mortgage is valueless in our law. The 
priority of a mortgage with us does not date from the mortgage agreement, but from 
the date of registration, and therefore a registered mortgage of later date is preferred 
to an unregistered mortgage of earlier date.’  
Section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 defines a mortgage bond to mean a 
bond attested by the registrar of deeds specially hypothecating immovable property. Deeds 
executed or attested by a registrar of deeds shall be deemed to be registered upon the affixing 
of the registrar’s signature.
160
 In terms of section 50(1) of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937, a 
mortgage bond shall be executed, in the presence of the registrar, by the owner of the 
immovable property or by a conveyancer duly authorized by the owner. A mortgage bond is, 
therefore, a deed executed by the owner embodying a mortgage, and once attested by the 
registrar of deeds, a deed giving real rights to a creditor. 
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4.2 Limited Real Rights Created in a Registered Mortgage Bond 
The real rights formed upon registration are what constitute the real security enjoyed by the 
creditor. The real rights are, however, limited in that they create restricted direct entitlement 
towards the property of another, and are enforceable against the debtor and third parties.
161
 
Solom CJ described the limited nature of such rights as when: 
‘[a creditor] possesses none of the ordinary rights of ownership, and is incapable of 
dealing with the property in any way whatsoever. [A creditor’s] rights are limited to 
securing under order of the [c]ourt a sale of the property for the purpose of satisfying 
[the] debt.’
162
  
The limited real rights flowing immediately upon registration are to secure a court 
order for the sale of the property, to satisfy a debt. This is but one example and another is 
given by van Wyk JA in his minority judgement in Lief, NO v Dettmann,
163
 where, at 449, he 
held that the only rights in favour of a creditor are, in respect of the mortgaged property, 
limited to:  
‘…restrain[ing] its alienation and the right to claim a preference in respect of its 
proceeds on insolvency of the [debtor].’ 
The rights that a creditor enjoys in the property of the debtor are, although real, limited to the 
rights in relations to the debt secured by the property and they, as stressed by van Wyk JA at 
449, can: 
‘…only exist in respect of a debt, existing or future, and it follows that they cannot be 
divorced from the debt secured by them.’ 
4.3 Nature of a Mortgage Bond 
4.3.1  Movable or immovable property? 
The fact that the underlying debt and the limited real rights cannot be separated from each 
other makes is difficult to determine whether a mortgage bond is in itself movable or 
immovable property. In Union Government v Fisher's Executrix
164
 the court was faced with 
this question, which was relevant because it needed to determine the domicile of an ordinary 
debt which turned on whether a mortgage bond is movable or immovable property. Wessels 
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JP, at 331, held that a right of action, or a claim which a person has against another, cannot be 
correctly described as a movable, explaining with reference to Old Authorities, that:  
‘Johannes Voet…seems to think that…all mortgage bonds ought to be regarded as 
movable property…A mortgage bond is nothing more or less than a debt. It is true 
that the mortgagee looks for payment of the debt, not only to the debtor, but to the 
property behind the debtor, the property that the debtor possesses, but that property is 
pledged, to him merely as security for the debt... The nature of the principal debt is a 
movable because it is a claim against the debtor for money, and money is a movable. 
Being a claim in reference to a movable the right, of action is itself to be regarded as a 
movable. It cannot make any difference, according to his view, that immovable 
property has been pledged, because that pledge is a mere accessory, and it would be 
absurd to say that the accessory has a different nature from that of the principal…’  
Although Wessels JP considered the views of Voet, he expressed a different view and 
believed that if one examines the question fundamentally, in certain instances:   
‘…a mortgage bond might well be regarded as a movable, though for other purposes 
it might be considered as an immovable…Cases may arise where it would be more 
proper to hold that a mortgage bond is rather of the nature of an immovable than of 
the nature of a movable…’
165
  
As such, depending on the circumstances of each case, a mortgage bond may either be 
regarded as movable or immovable. In Lief, NO v Dettmann, Wessels JA
166
 stated that the 
determining factor in classifying a mortgage bond as either movable or immovable may:  
‘…be said to depend on whether the purpose in question relates more particularly to 
the bond as constituting an acknowledgment of debt or as an instrument of title to a 
real right in the land hypothecated thereby.’
167
 
If, therefore, a mortgage bond is used in an action for payment of the debt, it will be regarded 
as movable property. If, however, the mortgage bond is used in show the existence and nature 
of the right, it will be regarded as immovable property. 
4.4 Functions of a Mortgage Bond 
A mortgage bond is a unique form of an agreement in that it is executed only by a debtor as 
the owner of the immovable property. This creates the impression that a mortgage bond 
cannot function as an agreement. The respondent in Union Government (Minister of Finance) 
v Chatwin
168
 argued this point as it was of a view that a mortgage bond is not a contract, but a 
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unilateral document, the primary function of which is to create a security and not to record 
the contract between the parties. Tindall J was not convinced by this argument and, at 321, 
held that the fact that a mortgage bond is not signed by a creditor is not decisive, but: 
‘[t]he real question is whether the parties intended the bond to record the terms of the 
loan and the conditions of repayment….[T]he terms of a mortgage bond must be held 
to be conclusive as to the conditions of repayment. Its object is not merely 
hypothecation but the settlement of the terms of the loan.’ 
From this it is clear that a mortgage bond has a dual function. It functions as an 
instrument of hypothecation and also functions as a record of the terms of the obligation. It is 
also possible for a mortgage bond to function as an acknowledgment of debt,
169
  because a 
mortgage bond:  
‘…as we know it is an…instrument hypothecating landed property...But even if this 
bond ceased to be a mortgage bond…then the instrument could have had further 
existence only as an acknowledgment of debt…’
170
 
As such, a mortgage bond over and beyond functioning as an instrument of hypothecation 
and as a record of the terms of the loan, it can also function as an acknowledgement of debt. 
4.4.1 Requirements for the validity of a mortgage bond 
The Appellate Division in Thienhaus v Metje & Ziegler Ltd
171
 examined the statutory 
requirements for a valid mortgage bond. The majority were of the view that the only statutory 
requirement is that every mortgage bond must contain a clear description of the property to 
be hypothecated.
172
 It is not a requirement for a mortgage bond to contain the amount, nature 
or origin of the debt.
173
 An acknowledgement of debt is certainly not a prerequisite for the 
validity of a mortgage bond.
174
 The origin and the prime purpose of the custom of 
acknowledgement of a debt is the facilitation of obtaining a quick and easy remedy against 
the mortgagor in case of default.
175
 As such, Williamson JA for the majority, at 67-68, held 
that the real function of a mortgage bond is to:  
‘….give notice to the world in general that a particular property of a debtor is the 
subject of a charge in favour of a particular creditor. The registration in a Deeds 
Office of the instrument of hypothecation is the means of informing other creditors 
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that [real rights] exist in favour of [a creditor]….The fact that…a [mortgage] bond 
may be employed for a purpose other than the hypothecation…should not affect the 
legal operation of that portion of the instrument constituting the hypothecation…[I]n 
testing its validity as a deed of hypothecation conferring a real right on the [creditor], 
all content of the [mortgage] bond which is not required in law to effect a proper 
hypothecation, is in reality surplusage for that purpose.’ 
Wessels JA had a different view to this, as he is of the opinion that a mortgage bond 
should contain at least some description of the debt.
176
 His reasoning is that having regard to 
the accessory nature of a mortgage bond, it is impossible for the antecedent agreement to be 
valid or enforceable without reference to the principal debt.
177
 The learned judge opined that 
it is essential for a mortgage bond to contain a description of the principal debt to which it is 
accessory.
178
  The real rights are formed on the basis of the mortgage bond, which becomes 
the exclusive document indicating the nature and extent of a creditor’s real rights on 
registration.
179
 If a mortgage bond does not refer to the debt which it is intended to secure, it 
would not be referring to an important aspect of a creditor’s real rights.
180
 Accordingly:  
‘[t]he real rights have neither meaning nor legal efficacy except in relation to the debt 
which it was intended to secure.
181
  
It is submitted that holding that rights in a mortgage bond have neither meaning nor 
legal efficacy except in relation to the debt is a correct view, but it does not mean that merely 
omitting to refer to the principal debt means that the mortgage bond is without legal efficacy. 
As is pointed out by the majority, registration is notice to the world that a debtor’s property is 
subject to a mortgage and this is the only point that the world should concern itself with. The 
details of the principal debt are of a personal nature as between a creditor and a debtor. It is 
only upon registration that third parties will concern themselves with the details of the 
principal debt, and even then concern will be in relation to the property itself and nothing 
else.  
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4.5 Transferability of Rights Created in a Mortgage Bond 
4.5.1 Cession of rights at common law 
A mortgage bond can be ceded either out-and-out or ceded as security.
182
 Where it is ceded 
out-and-out, the existing creditor no longer has any interest in the mortgage bond.
183
 
However, where a mortgage bond is ceded as security, the existing creditor retains an interest 
in the mortgage bond and when the creditor pays the debt the cession may be cancelled.
184
 It 
is said that a cession in securitatem debiti should be regarded as a pledge of incorporeal 
property.
185
 A debtor can pledge its own right held as a creditor against a third party as 
security to a new creditor.
186
 Van der Walt and Pienaar are of the opinion that the right held 
as a creditor in this regard is not ceded to a new creditor, but is pledged and cannot be 
disposed of.
187
 As was seen above, a mortgage bond can be seen as corporeal movable 
embodying incorporeal rights. As such:  
‘[a]n incorporeal right is by its nature not susceptible of physical delivery, but the 
pledgor must do some act to show that he divests himself of that right and vests it in 
the pledgee for the purpose of his holding it as security….[T]his can be effected…by 
a cession of the right, and…[is] the equivalent of what would in the case of goods be 
delivery is in the case of incorporeal rights a cession.’
188
  
In Graaff-Reinet Board of Executors Ltd. v Estate Erlank,
189
 Louwrens J, at 46, held that:  
‘[i]t is clear from a number of authorities in our law that you can pledge your interest 
in a mortgage bond, and that the pledgee can sue on it, even if the pledge is not 
registered. Nor is it necessary for the cessionary to give notice to the debtor in order 
to vest the right ceded in the cessionary. All the rights of the transferor are 
extinguished by the transfer, and thenceforth only the transferee, not the transferor, 
can enforce the claim against an unwilling debtor.’ 
It would appear then that a pledge of a mortgage bond is effected by delivery, coupled 
with some agreement to cede. As such, it appears that registration is not required when a 
mortgage bond is pledged and, as will be seen below, it is difficult to imagine how a 
mortgage bond can be pledged without also being registered.  However, if it is accepted that a 
cession in securitatem debiti is regarded as a pledge of incorporeal property, then whether 
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registration is not necessary is doubtful. Cession of a mortgage bond is not just a simple case 
of agreeing to cede a creditor’s right. 
4.5.2 Cession of rights in terms of statute 
Section 3(1)(f)
190
 provides that the registrar of deeds shall register out-and-out cessions and 
cessions made in security of registered mortgage bonds, and register cancellations of cessions 
made in security. Regulation 39(1)(c) made under the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 provides 
that the authority for cession of a mortgage bond shall be given by the holder thereof, in the 
prescribed form. In Lief, NO v Dettmann the Appellate Division had determine whether a 
creditor could lawfully and effectively cede its rights under a mortgage bond by ceding only a 
portion of its personal right of action to recover the debt, without at the same time ceding real 
security which it holds in terms of a mortgage bond. Giving judgement for the majority, 
Wessels JA held that the borrowing of money and the agreement to mortgage creates personal 
rights
191
 and once a debtor agrees to mortgage and registers a mortgage bond, it is only then 
that real rights are created.
192
 In this regard:  
‘[r]egistration does not affect the principal obligation, which…retains its character as 
a personal right of action…for the payment of the interest and capital.’
193
 
It is against this background that the learned judge arrived at the conclusion that when 
a mortgage bond is ceded as security two things must happen: firstly the right of action in 
terms of the principal obligation will have to be transferred to a creditor, and secondly the 
real right will also have to be conveyed to the creditor.
194
 The right of action can be ceded by 
a cession agreement, but in the event that the right of action is secured the creditor must be 
placed in possession of the real right,
195
 which is done by registration. Wessels JA was of the 
opinion that cession for security does not mean that the creditor retain its right in the action, 
but that the creditor’s continued right in the action flows from the agreement that the right of 
action will be ceded back to the creditor upon discharging of the debt.
196
  
The Appellate Division thus made it clear that cession of a mortgage bond always 
requires registration in the deeds office. However, this was subsequently not applied in the 
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Witwatersrand Local Division case of Lief, NO v Western Credit (Africa) (Pty) Ltd,
197
 
relating to a cession of a mortgage bond where a creditor was placed under judicial 
management before the cession could be registered in the deeds office. Snyman J referred 
Lief, NO v Dettmann, but held that:  
‘[f]or the purpose of passing ownership our law makes a clear distinction between the 
sale of land and the cession of mortgage bonds over land. The former requires 
registration in the Deeds Registry Office to pass ownership so as to be effective 
against creditors upon insolvency, while the latter becomes effective upon its 
execution.’
198
 
Snyman J was thus of the view that mere cession of a mortgage bond by agreement without 
registration is sufficient. This judgement was, however, rejected by Smalberger J in Barclays 
Western Bank Ltd v Comfy Hotels Ltd
199
 and the Appellate Division ruling of Lief, NO v 
Dettmann was preferred and held to be good in law. Smalberger J held that no authority was 
given by Snyman J for his reason in arriving at his conclusion, and the need for registration 
for a cession is still a requirement.
200
  
Thus, a mortgage bond is a unique kind of document serving for different purposes 
and giving rise to different legal consequences, which come about only on registration. On 
the one hand there are personal rights, which are transferred to another person by mere 
execution of a cession agreement, while on the other hand there are real rights, transferred to 
another person only upon registration of the cession. These rights are, however, dependent on 
each other and it is with this legal complexity in mind that we examine the power of a 
practitioner to suspend such rights.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE EXTENT OF THE BUSINESS RESCUE PRACTITIONER’S 
POWER TO SUSPEND RIGHTS 
The business rescue provisions are some of the most innovative sections of the Companies 
Act of 2008.
201
 The business rescue process entails that a company is temporarily supervised, 
there is a temporary moratorium on claims and proceedings against a company and a business 
rescue plan is developed and implemented.
202
 The proceedings are initiated either by a 
resolution of the board of directors of a company
203
 or by an application to court by an 
affected person.
204
 The effect of business rescue on contracts is that a practitioner may 
suspend or apply to court to cancel any obligation of a company during such proceedings. 
5.1 Effect of Business Rescue on Contracts 
5.1.1 Companies Bill, B 61D-2008 
On 31 January 2007 Cabinet approved for publication a draft Companies Bill 2007, which 
was published for comment.
205
 The revised Companies Bill was introduced to Parliament 
during June 2008.
206
 In terms of section 136(2) of the Companies Bill of 2008, it was 
proposed that:  
‘…despite any provision of an agreement to the contrary, during business rescue 
proceedings, the practitioner may cancel or suspend entirely, partially or conditionally 
any provision of an agreement to which the company is a party at the commencement 
of the business rescue period…’ (Emphasis added) 
Accordingly, when the Bill was first introduced to Parliament it was intended for a 
practitioner to have the wide discretion of cancelling or suspending any provision in an 
agreement. The Bill was approved by Parliament and the President assented to the Companies 
Act of 2008 on 8 April 2009
207
 and thus the abovementioned provision was enacted as law, 
but was not yet in force. 
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5.1.2 Companies Amendment Bill, B40-2010 
The Companies Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament in November 2010
208
 for the 
purpose of amending the Companies Act of 2008. In relation section 136, it was intended to 
amend the provision so that a practitioner may:  
‘(a) entirely, partially or conditionally suspend, for the duration of the business rescue 
proceedings,…any obligation of the company that— 
(i) arises under an agreement to which the company …was a party at the 
commencement of the business rescue…proceedings; and  
(ii) would otherwise become due during those proceedings; or 
(b) apply urgently to a court to entirely, partially or conditionally cancel, on any terms 
that are just and reasonable in the circumstances, any agreement to which the 
company is a party.’ 
The reason for the amendment was that certain stakeholders raised concern about the 
powers of the practitioner, because they believed that a practitioner had an unfettered 
discretion in the cancellation of contracts.
209
 It was therefore agreed that a practitioner must 
submit to court for confirmation of all contracts, including security contracts, which are 
intended to be cancelled.
210
 The amendments were accepted by Parliament and the President 
assented
211
 to the Companies Amendment Act.
212
  
5.1.3 Current provision on effect of business rescue on contracts 
The Companies Act of 2008 came into effect only on 1 May 2011, after substantial 
amendments.
213
 Therefore, although the original section 136 was in our statute books when 
the Act was first signed into law, the provision only came into force in its amended form. As 
it stands currently, during a company’s business rescue proceedings a practitioner may 
entirely, partially or conditionally suspend, for the duration of the proceedings, any obligation 
of a company.
214
 The obligation must be that arising under an agreement to which the 
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company was a party at the commencement
215
 and would otherwise become due during the 
proceedings.
216
  
If a provision of an agreement is suspended and it relates to property serving as 
security granted by the company, that provision will still continue with respect to any 
proposed disposal.
217
A practitioner cannot suspend any provision of an employment 
contract,
218
 or an agreement relating to transactions on exchange or termination and netting, 
which would have applied had the company been liquidated.
219
  
In the event that a practitioner wishes to entirely, partially or conditionally cancel any 
obligation of a company, then such a practitioner must urgently apply to court to do so on any 
terms that are just and equitable in the circumstances.
220
 However, a court may not cancel any 
provision of an employment contract outside labour laws,
221
 or an agreement relating to 
transactions on exchange or termination and netting, which would have applied had the 
company been liquidated.
222
Any party to an agreement that is affected by the suspension or 
cancellation of any provision may assert a claim for only damages against the company.
223
 
5.2 Comparative Analysis of Section 136 and U.S.C §365   
The concept of business rescue is largely modelled on Chapter 11 of the United State of 
America Bankruptcy Code,
224
 which focuses on reorganisation of corporates that are in 
financial difficulty.
225
 By reorganisation, a struggling but otherwise strong business replaces 
its existing capital structure with a sensible one that better reflects the conditions the business 
finds itself.
226
 In particular, section 136 is modelled on U.S.C §365.
227
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5.2.1 U.S.C §365 
When a corporation is under a Chapter 11 reorganisation, a trustee operates the business.
228
 
However, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights and shall perform all the duties and 
functions of a trustee, unless a court provides otherwise.
229
 A debtor in possession is defined 
to mean a debtor,
230
 which effectively means a company under reorganisation and thus the 
very company under reorganisation operates the business. Reference to trustee, therefore, 
means a company under reorganisation. In terms of §365(a), a trustee may assume or reject 
any executory contracts of the debtor, subject to court approval. An executory contract is a 
contract whereby a debtor’s obligation to a third party is a liability in the debtor’s estate, 
while at the same time a third party’s corresponding obligation to the debtor is a claim in the 
debtor’s estate.
231
 To put it simply, it means a contract that is both an asset and liability in the 
debtor’s estate.
232
 It is effectively a contract placing obligations on both parties to perform 
where neither of the parties has fully performed yet.
233
 
If a trustee assumes an executory contract, it must assume the entire contract with all 
its burdens.
234
 As such, it would appear that if a trustee rejects an executory contract it must 
do so in its entirety with all its advantages.
235
 A trustee may assume or assign any executory 
contract, even if there is a clause in the contract prohibiting assignment.
236
 However, a trustee 
cannot assume or assign an executory contract if the law excuses any party, other than the 
debtor, to not accept or render performance to any other person other than the debtor
237
 and 
such a party does not consent to the assumption or assignment.
238
 This provision speaks of 
contracts to make loans or extent credit for the benefit of the debtor.
239
  
The powers of a trustees to assign an executory contract must be read in conjunction 
with §365(f)(1), which provides that regardless of a clause restricting assignment a trustee 
can still assign the contract only if the trustee assumes the contract
240
 and adequate assurance 
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of future performance by the assignee is provided.
241
 It would appear, therefore, that in order 
for an executory contract to be assigned, it must first be assumed by the trustee. Assignment 
of an executory contract that has been assumed by a trustee relieves the estate from any claim 
arising from breach of the contract occurring after the assignment.
242
  
If there has been a default in an executory contract, a trustee may still assume such a 
contract
243
 provided the trustee cures the default,
244
 compensates the other party for any 
actual pecuniary loss caused by the default
245
 and provides adequate assurance of future 
performance.
246
 Even if the parties agree otherwise, an executory contract may not be 
terminated or modified solely
247
 on the basis of the financial condition of a debtor,
248
 or the 
commencement of the reorganisation,
249
 or the appointment of a trustee.
250
 This provision 
effectively renders an acceleration clause ineffective.  
A trustee may assume or reject an executory contract at any time before confirmation 
by the court of a reorganisation plan, but a party to the contract can apply to court for an 
order requiring a trustee to determine a specified time within which to assume or reject the 
contract.
251
 If an executory contract is rejected, the rejection thereof constitutes a breach.
252
 It 
is believed that rejection is not the same as a breach of a contract outside bankruptcy, because 
rejection of an unfavourable executory contract is akin to abandoning an asset.
253
 However, 
little of consequence turns on this distinction.
254
 
5.2.2 Similarities and differences between section 136 and §365 
When a company is under business rescue, only an appointed practitioner is empowered to 
deal with contracts of a company. Unlike in the United States, a company does not have 
powers to suspend contracts during business rescue. 
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A practitioner is given powers to suspend any obligation of a company arising out of 
any agreement, except employment agreements and agreements relating to transactions on 
exchange or termination and netting. A trustee on the other hand is given powers to assume 
or reject only executory contracts. Should a contract not constitute an executory contract in 
terms of United States law, then a trustee is not empowered to assume or reject such a 
contract. Therefore a practitioner has wider scope as to which contracts to suspend, whereas a 
trustee can only deal with executory contracts. 
A practitioner is empowered to suspend entirely, partially or conditionally any 
obligation in a specific agreement. The ability to ‘partially’ suspend ‘any obligation’ seems to 
work on the premise that any one agreement has multiple obligations or that in the event that 
there is only one obligation arising from an agreement, such an obligation can be suspended 
or cancelled partially while the other bit or bits of the obligation continue. Thus it would 
appear that a practitioner has unfettered powers to pick and choose which obligation or 
obligations in one specific agreement to suspend. The powers of a trustee are – although very 
far reaching – limited to either full assumption or full rejection of an executory contract. A 
trustee has no discretion in this regard.  
A practitioner may only entirely, partially or conditionally cancel any obligation 
arising under an agreement with leave from court. It is due to the extra-judicial nature of the 
practitioner’s power to suspend obligation that this dissertation is focusing on this particular 
aspect of the power. To the contrary, a trustee may either assume or reject executory 
contracts, subject to leave from court. Thus in both instances, leave from court has to be 
obtained. A practitioner only needs leave from our court to cancel any obligation in an 
agreement, but not to suspend same. Initially it was intended for a practitioner to suspend and 
cancel an obligation without leave of court, but this was later amended after an outcry from 
stakeholders stating that such a situation gave practitioners unfettered powers in 
cancellation.
255
  
Some argue that the amendment of section 136 was a dilution of §365(a).
256
 Although 
at first glance it may be seen to be the case, it is submitted that this is not necessarily true 
since a practitioner still has far wider scope whereas a trustee’s scope has always been 
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limited. For one, both assumption and rejection of an executory contract require leave of 
court. Secondly, it is only a specific kind a contract that a trustee can assume or reject. Lastly, 
a trustee does not have the discretion on whether to partly assume or reject parts of the 
executory agreement. 
Section 136(2)(a) does not explicitly state the time when a practitioner can suspend 
any obligation in an agreement. It only provides that a practitioner may suspend any 
obligation ‘during business rescue proceedings’, which some argue means that any suggested 
suspension would first have to be included in a business rescue plan and then put to the vote 
by creditors.
257
 Furthermore, the section only provides that a practitioner may apply urgently 
to court to cancel an obligation in an agreement. Again, it is not clear whether this urgent 
application needs to be done only if the cancellation is provided for in terms of a business 
rescue plan or whether it can be done immediately. It is submitted that due to the wording 
section 136(2)(a), which indicates wide discretion enjoyed by a practitioner, it would appear 
that a practitioner can suspend any obligation in an agreement at any time as the practitioner 
sees fit. Similarly, a practitioner should be able to apply immediately to court to have an 
obligation in an agreement cancelled. If a practitioner needs to wait for the adoption of a 
business rescue plan allowing for cancellation, then the issue of urgency in court would be 
put to question. To the contrary, §365 specifically states that a trustee may assume or reject 
an executory contract at any time before confirmation of a plan.  
Section 136 is silent on assignment and acceleration clauses in an agreement. This is 
in contrast to §365, which specifically states that clauses prohibiting assignment do not bar a 
trustee from assigning the executory contract and that acceleration clauses do not come into 
effect during reorganisation. In the same vein, §365 does not deal with a provision relating to 
security whereas section 136 does. It must be noted that despite suspension, a security 
provision applies during property disposal, but in all other instances the provision will not 
apply when suspended. 
Both section 136 and §365 provide for assertion of a damages claim. In South Africa, 
one of the elements to prove in cases of a damages claim is of course wrongfulness. It would 
seem that there would be no wrongfulness when a practitioner is acting within the authority 
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provided by legislation.
258
 Should that be the case, it is left to question whether a court would 
be able to uphold a damages claim when one of the elements to prove in such a claim is 
lacking. 
5.3 What is Being Entirely, Partially or Conditionally Suspended?  
5.3.1 “Obligation” or “Provision”? 
The wording of section 136 is somewhat problematic because on the one hand section 
136(2)(a) refers to the suspension of  ‘any obligation’ arising out of an agreement. On the 
other hand, section 136(2A) refers to any ‘provision’ in an employment contract,  any 
‘provision’ in agreements relating to transactions on exchange or termination and netting, and 
any ‘provision’ in an agreement relating to security. Similarly in terms of the wording, 
section 136(1) refers to any ‘provision’ in an agreement that does not allow suspension or 
cancellation of any obligation.  So too is the same wording in section 136(3) when referring 
to asserting a claim for damages as a result of suspension or cancellation of any ‘provision’. 
An “obligation” and a “provision” can mean two different things. A “provision” could 
for instance not place any “obligation” on a company. One wonders then whether a 
practitioner is empowered to suspend any “provision” which does not place any “obligation” 
on a company. Admittedly, in many cases there would be no reason why a practitioner would 
want to suspend a “provision” not placing any “obligation” on a company. It could be that the 
intended purpose of the wording was to cover instances of partial suspension of an agreement 
expressing “any obligation” in more than one “provision”. 
5.3.2 Personal rights 
When a company and a creditor enter into a loan agreement, the obligation that arises is a 
legal bond which compels a company to perform in the form of repayment of the loan. The 
legal bond is between a company and a creditor, and in the hands of a creditor the claim for 
repayment is a personal right. The obligation is the origin of a personal right and, therefore, 
when a practitioner suspends this obligation, the practitioner is suspending a personal right of 
a creditor. Practically speaking, a practitioner is empowered to suspend a term in a loan 
agreement which provides for the repayment of the loan. I would imagine that partial 
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suspension would be instances where a practitioner provides that the company will 
temporarily pay a lesser instalment than that which was originally agreed upon. 
5.3.3 Limited real rights 
Where a mortgage bond has been registered in favour of a creditor as security for repayment 
of a loan, the creditor does not only have a personal right against a company to claim 
repayment but also real rights by virtue of registration. Registration does not change the 
nature of the underlying personal right. The real rights born out of registration are limited and 
only relate to the property so as to restrain its alienation, to seek an execution order and claim 
preference in its proceeds upon its sale in insolvency. However, although these limited real 
rights in a mortgage bond are separate and distinct from the personal right in a loan 
agreement, they only exist in respect of the obligation secured and cannot be divorced from 
each other. In other words, the limited real rights are accessory in nature and if there is no 
personal right, the limited real rights have no effectiveness or significance. Therefore, it 
would seem that when a practitioner suspends the personal right, the practitioner is 
effectively, perhaps by operation of the law, also suspending the limited real rights. The 
personal right, although suspended, still exists and so it follows that the limited real rights 
also exist, but the key difference is that limited real rights are registered in the deeds office. 
Suspension of real rights is quite foreign to our system of law and so it is not clear whether 
the “suspension” by a practitioner should be regarded as having occurred immediately, or 
taking legal effect upon the suspension of the underlying obligation, or only upon registration 
in the deeds office. 
5.4 Should there be Registration in the Deeds Office for Noting the “Suspension” of 
Limited Real Rights? 
As section 136 is modelled on §365, it may be useful to first look at the United States 
registration system and determine whether such a system is similar to our deeds registry 
system. Having done so, the necessity for registration to note the “suspension” of limited real 
rights will be explored.  
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5.4.1 The United States system of registration  
In the United States the land registration system is based mainly on private conveyance and 
the registration of deeds.
259
 Few lawyers there are familiar with the land title registration 
system, because such system is rarely used.
260
 Land recordation is the primary system for 
documenting legal rights to land.
261
 Serious attempts have been made to introduce title 
registration, but so far only about fifteen states have enacted the Torrens system.
262
 However, 
the registration of title in those states is voluntary and the high primary costs of searching for 
and establishing title makes registration unusual.
263
  
The principal motivation for creating the recordation system was to encourage the 
transfer of titles of land from the public domain to private individuals.
264
 It provides a public 
record of land ownership and notice of the existence of certain continuing interests, 
encumbrances, and claims.
265
 However, the system does not guarantee the title of the 
recorded deeds, instead the system invites people to inspect copies of the deeds and draw 
their own conclusion as to the title.
266
 To protect an interest in property under the recordation 
system, a claimant must file a deed describing that interest with the public recorder's 
office.
267
 The deed will then be recorded in an alphabetical grantor-grantee index, thus 
providing notice of that interest to all.
268
 Whenever an interest in property is transferred, a 
search is made by undertaking a complex, tedious, and costly search through the grantor-
grantee indexes, to ensure that the transferor does indeed possess the interest to be conveyed 
and to confirm that no outstanding claims exist.
269
 
Title insurance is common in the United States and private companies keep land 
records of their own.
270
 Title insurance companies have thus duplicated and are maintaining 
public land records of the entire country in their own private title banks.
271
 They insure title if 
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their records indicate that that the title is sound,
272
 thus assuming the risk of purchasing an 
impaired title. Therefore, it is the companies, instead of the title system or public officials, 
who provide the assurance that the title is clear.
273
 
5.4.2 The difference between the United States recordation system and our registration 
system 
Our system of registration differs fundamentally to that of the United States, because their 
recordation system is purely a system of registration of deeds. Our system of registration is of 
course unique in that is possesses characteristics of both registration of title and registration 
of deeds. One such characteristic in our system leaning towards registration of title is the 
involvement of the registrar of deeds. In the United States, private companies play a large 
role in the recordation process as they maintain public land records. Our system of 
registration is the complete opposite to this, because the office of the registrar of deeds plays 
a proactive role in our registration process. 
The recordation system in the United States does not guarantee that a person in whose 
name a deed is recorded is the true owner thereof. Our system of registration is such that it 
also does not guarantee that the land register truly reflects title in land. This, however, is 
because a person in South Africa can sometimes acquire ownership in land by, for example, 
acquisitive prescription or marriage in community of property, without the land register 
reflecting same. The issue here would not be so much that our land register is not a reliable 
source of determining title, but that the title might have changed by operation of the law 
without the change being reflected in the land register. In all other instances, our land register 
is an authoritative source of land title.  
A person in the United States protects his or her interest in property by simply filing a 
deed describing the interest. Our system rests on the principle that only the registered owner 
or nominee can convey rights in land. The deeds office will not convey rights in land unless it 
is satisfied that the person intending to convey the real rights is either the registered owner or 
duly authorised by the registered owner. Accordingly, each owner of land or holder of real 
rights in land remains as such until registration, or until a court order provides otherwise, or 
until disposal by operation of the law. 
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The recordation of interest in the United States acts as constructive notice to all, and 
people are then deemed to know of the existence of interest in property when recorded. Our 
courts have long rejected the application of constructive notice in registration and held that 
effectiveness of registered title does not rest on constructive knowledge deemed to follow 
from registration, but on the contrary rests in general on a valid registration itself. 
Having regard to these differences in the systems, the United States would appear to 
not place great emphasis in registration like we do and nothing can be learned with regards to 
their handling of executory contracts. The differences indicate that the power to suspend 
limited real rights in South Africa has practical effect than that in the United States. 
5.4.3 Necessity for registration to note the “suspension” of limited real rights 
As was seen above, ownership of land sometimes occurs by operation of the law and it is for 
this primary reason our system of registration does not guarantee title. It could be argued that 
the “suspension” of limited real rights occurs by operation of the law and as such, it would 
not be necessary to note it in the land register. However, such a stance would further 
perpetuate the unreliability of our land register as a source of information with regards to 
registered real right.  
At the centre of our registration system is the land registers which the registrar of 
deeds must keep, whether by means of a computer or in any other manner, such registers 
containing particulars as are necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the 
Deeds Registries Act of 1937 or any other law, and for maintaining an efficient system of 
registration calculated to afford security of title and ready reference to any registered deed.
274
 
Therefore, the register registrar of deeds is compelled to keep land registers and maintain 
them with necessary particulars. As such, when registered rights in a mortgage bond are 
subsequently “suspended”, such information should be recorded in the land register for 
purposes of maintaining complete records. In this way continuity and completeness of 
records is always maintained. 
The nature and effect of our registration system is centred on the publicity principle, 
which entails that registration is required for the creation, transfer and termination of all real 
rights in immovable property. If we accept that a practitioner can suspend limited real rights, 
then the suspension should only be able to come into force upon registration. A mortgage 
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bond has only a legal effect if registered and, it becomes effective from that day. It therefore 
follows that “suspension” of limited real rights should also only have legal effect if and when 
it is noted in the deeds office. Simply put, registration of “suspension” of limited real rights 
by a practitioner should be a requirement. Mere suspension of the underlying obligation 
seems not to be enough to achieve the objective of suspending any obligation. 
The purpose and function of our registration system has a dual objective of vesting 
ownership in real rights in land and making a public record thereof. The function of vesting 
of ownership can in certain instances be separated from the other. Thus the objective of 
making public records could, in other instances, stand on its own as the function of 
registration. One such instance should be the “suspension” of limited real rights to ensure that 
public record is always maintained and up to date. Currently, a person can go to the deeds 
office and have a complete picture of the land of this country and any other encumbrances 
registered against such land. The full picture would not be complete if the “suspension” of 
limited real rights is not noted in the deeds office. Such situation would create an incomplete 
picture of limited real rights in a mortgage bonds being “suspended”, but still registered in the 
deeds office.  
Regulation 39(1) made under the Deed Registries Act of 1937 provides for acts of 
registration in relation to a mortgage bond, which are: cancellation;
275
 release of the property 
or person of a joint debtor;
276
 noting of a part-payment in respect of the capital due;
277
 the 
noting of a reduction of the cover;
278
 waiver of preference of the security hypothecated in 
favour of another bond;
279
 cession;
280
 cancellation of a cession made as security;
281
 
substitution of another person as debtor;
282
 noting of an agreement varying the terms;
283
 and 
the substitution of other land for the land hypothecated.
284
 These acts of registration form part 
of the duties of the registrar in terms of section 3(1) of the Deeds Registries of 1937, for 
which authorisation must be given by the holder of the mortgage bond in the prescribed 
signed and witnessed form. These acts of registration are clearly to keep the land register 
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updated as the mortgage bond is affected. It is, therefore, submitted that the Deeds Registries 
Act of 1937 ought to be amended so that the “suspension” of limited real rights in a mortgage 
bond can be included in Regulation 39(1) as one of the acts of registration. 
It appears that the listed acts of registration in the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 do not 
require anything of a practitioner to give effect to his or her power, when limited real rights in 
a mortgage bonds are affected. The reason for this is simply that there previously had not 
been any legislation in our law that made it possible for an underlying agreement to be 
suspended, having the effect on a mortgage bond. In this regard, legislative reform may be 
necessary to provide some form of certainty when rights in a mortgage bond are affected. 
Such rights are property of a creditor in terms of private law and their suspension could quite 
possibly infringe on a creditor’s right to property in terms of the property clause. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
Our Constitution is the supreme law of the country and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled, and law inconsistent with it is invalid.
285
 As a result, the Companies Act of 2008 
and particularly section 136(2)(a) ought to be in line with the Constitution which guarantees 
that:  
‘[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’.
286
 
As was seen in Chapter 5, the suspension of any obligation by a practitioner could 
affect both personal and limited real rights of a creditor. It will be seen herein that limited real 
rights are regarded as property in terms of private law. As such, one must always turn to the 
property clause to test whether the suspension of those rights constitute an infringement of a 
creditor’s right to property. 
6.1 Application of the Property Clause 
The property clause applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary 
and all organs of state.
287
 Matters arising from the property clause in the Constitution concern 
the application of the clause to actions between state organs and private parties or to the 
conduct between private parties only.
288
 In any event, the property clause will always apply 
where private parties conduct themselves in a way authorised by law.
289
 Here we are, 
therefore, concerned with the application of the property clause in a way authorised by 
section 136(2)(a). 
6.2  Whose Property is Protected?  
The protection afforded by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution applies to natural persons.
290
 
However, a juristic person is also entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent 
required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.
291
 As such, creditors 
as either natural or juristic persons may not be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
general application.  
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6.3 The Law of General Application 
Law in the context of the property clause includes statutes and its regulations, but could also 
extend to common law and customary law.
292
 Furthermore, generally applicable law entails 
that it must apply generally rather solely to an individual case.
293
 There can be no doubt that 
section 136(2)(a) constitutes a law of general application and so it is now left to determine 
whether it constitutes an infringement of the property clause by permitting arbitrary 
deprivation of property. In order to do so one must first determine whether suspended 
personal and limited real rights constitute property in terms of the property clause; secondly 
whether the suspension constitutes deprivation; and thirdly, whether that deprivation is 
arbitrary.
294
 
6.4 What is Regarded as Property in Terms of the Constitution? 
The property clause does not define what constitutes property. However, as a starting point it 
must be noted that, for purposes for the property clause, property is not limited to land.
295
 It is 
the task of the courts to determine what defines the constitutional content and scope of 
property.
296
 The matter of First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for 
the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance
 297
 is an example where the Constitutional Court was faced with this task. 
This matter dealt with the constitutionality of a provision in the Customs and Excise Act 
allowing certain goods to be seized, which belonged to someone other than the person liable 
to the state for customs duty. The matter provides good authority in the interpretation of the 
property clause in relation to a provision in an Act of Parliament.   
In the determination of whether the seizure provision is constitutional, the 
Constitutional Court had to first determine whether that which was taken away from someone 
not liable to the state for custom duty amounted to property for the purpose of the property 
clause. Ackermann J gave the judgement and observed that the property clause embodies a 
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negative protection of property and does not expressly guarantee the right to acquire, hold 
and dispose of property.
298
 Furthermore, the property clause has to be seen both as protecting 
existing private property rights as well as serving public interest, and striking a proportional 
balance between the two. Ackermann J, at 51, held that for those reasons:  
‘[a]t this stage of our constitutional jurisprudence it is…practically impossible to 
furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a comprehensive definition of property 
for purposes of section 25.’ 
Specifically in the First National Bank matter, the court held that ownership of a 
corporeal movable lies at the heart of our constitutional concept of property, because of the 
nature and object of the right.
299
 The definition of property for constitutional protection in all 
other instances is thus left open for interpretation, depending on the circumstances of each 
case. In deliberately leaving open the constitutional definition of property, the court gave the 
impression that incorporeal property with a distinct economic value may be regarded as 
property for purposes of constitutional protection.
300
 Although the definition of property in 
terms of the Constitution is left open, it would appear that whether our courts will regard 
rights as property, deserving of constitutional protection, will depend on the nature and the 
object of the right. 
6.4.1 Are suspended personal rights considered property in terms of the Constitution?  
In modern South African law, contractual rights to performances are generally not regarded 
as property rights.
301
 The traditional civil law concept of property is traditionally restricted to 
real rights with regard to corporeal things, but it would appear that the property clause 
includes both real and personal rights with regards to both corporeal and incorporeal 
property.
302
 The constitutional property concept is a protective shield to a broader variety of 
interests.
303
 The right that a creditor has to claim repayment from a debtor is a claim, which 
could be an asset that may be of considerable value forming part of a creditor’s estate. 
Having regard to the nature and the object of the right in this instance, it would appear that 
the suspended personal right is worthy of constitutional protection.  
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6.4.2 Are suspended limited real rights considered property in terms of the Constitution? 
There is absolutely no doubt that limited real rights flowing from a registered mortgage bond 
are property in terms of private law, and a person in whose name such rights are registered is 
the owner thereof. The private law concept of ownership may influence the constitutional 
concept of property, because it may provide a point of departure for an investigation into the 
scope of protection under the Constitution.
304
 This means that real rights that are considered 
property in terms of private law will most likely also be considered property in terms of the 
Constitution, and this was the case in Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC.
305
 This matter 
related to an application for removal of a restrictive condition registered against a title deed 
and in handing down judgment, Binns-Ward AJ, at 19I-J, held that: 
‘[p]roperty rights are among the fundamental rights enshrined in chap 2 of the 
Constitution. A purposive construction of “property” means that it should be read to 
include any right to, or in property. There is no valid basis to read down 
the provisions to obtain a more limited meaning of the word.’  
As such, it is submitted that limited real rights flowing from a mortgage bond are such rights 
in immovable property that should be protected in terms of the property clause. 
6.5 Deprivation of Property in Terms of the Property Clause.  
Once it is determined that a particular interest constitutes property in terms of the 
Constitution, the next step is to determine deprivation in the context of the property clause.
306
 
The court in First National Bank held that the term deprivation is misleading, because it 
creates the wrong impression that deprivation refers to the taking away of property.
307
 This 
may not necessarily be the case, because as Ackermann J, at 57, pointed out:  
‘[i]n a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or 
in the property concerned.’ 
Evidently, property does not need to be completely taken away; in that any 
interference with private property may involve deprivation. This gives rise to the question as 
to what extent of interference is required for there to be sufficient deprivation to offend the 
property clause. The First National Bank matter left this open and subsequently, the matter of 
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Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government & Housing in 
the Province of Gauteng and Others
308
 gave us some guidance in this regard. This 
Constitutional Court matter related to a provision in the Local Government Municipal 
Systems Act 32 of 2000, which provides that a registrar of deeds may not register transfer of 
property without a rate clearance certificate. Almost all the parties agreed that the provision 
does bring about deprivation of property but in spite of this the court still pronounced on the 
issue of deprivation and, more specifically, the extent of interference that will give rise to 
deprivation. Yacoob J gave judgement for the majority, and at 32 held that:  
‘[w]hether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the interference with 
or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation. It is not necessary in this case to 
determine precisely what constitutes deprivation. No more need be said than that at 
the very least, substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal 
restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society 
would amount to deprivation.’ (Emphasis added)  
Therefore, deprivation always takes place when either: property or rights in property 
are taken away;
309
 or property or rights in property are significantly interfered with;
310
 or 
there is a limitation in property or rights in property that goes beyond normal restrictions on 
property use or enjoyment. All this is a sacrifice that holders of rights in private property may 
have to make without compensation.
311
  
6.5.1 Does section 136(2)(a) deprive a creditor of property? 
The ability of a practitioner to suspend any obligation in an agreement may significantly 
interfere or limit rights of a creditor that goes beyond normal restrictions on the use or 
enjoyment of those rights. The suspension of the personal right to claim repayment 
significantly interferes or limit these rights, because a creditor cannot, while the personal 
right is suspended, claim repayment of money lent and advanced. As such and because the 
personal right is linked to the real rights, a creditor temporarily no longer has use or 
enjoyment of real security previously afforded to a creditor by mere registration of a 
mortgage bond. A creditor effectively and temporary has no claim and logically no real 
security. The suspension of these rights could, therefore, be regarded as temporary 
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deprivation of property of a creditor and it is now left to determine whether the temporary 
nature of the deprivation makes any difference 
6.5.2 Temporary deprivation of property 
A creditor is not divested of the rights, but is temporarily deprived thereof. The exact extent 
of deprivation is of course significant interference or limitation that goes beyond normal 
restrictions on use or enjoyment, but in the instance of suspension it could be argued that the 
temporary deprivation is not significant in that a creditor does not lose property. The 
Mkontwana matter dealt with a provision that prohibited a registrar of deeds to register 
transfer of property without a rates clearance certificate, which meant that a person’s right to 
transfer property is temporarily interfered with until such time that a rates clearance 
certificate is obtained. 
O’Regan J concurred with the order of the majority, but gave a very interesting 
separate judgement that speaks to temporary deprivation of property.
312
 The learned Justice is 
of the view that the First National Bank matter did not hold that deprivation should have a 
wide ambit.
313
 She held that the effect of the challenged provision in First National Bank was 
that an owner could be deprived of all rights in a corporeal movable, such loss clearly 
constituting deprivation.
314
 Accordingly, it was not necessary for the court to consider in any 
great detail the precise ambit of what would constitute deprivation in circumstances where an 
interference with property fell short of a loss of ownership.
315
 In Mkontwana, the owner was 
not deprived of ownership by the challenged provision, because only one of the incidents of 
ownership was being impaired.
316
 She deemed it necessary, therefore, to consider whether an 
interference with ownership falling short of loss of ownership will fall within the concept of 
deprivation.
317
 The learned Justice acknowledged that some deprivations of property rights or 
depriving the holder of a real right could constitute a significant impairment in the interest 
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that the owner or real right holder has in the property, without being divested of the 
property.
318
 However, at 90, she emphasised that:  
‘…there may be limitations on property rights which are either so trivial or are so 
widely accepted as appropriate in open and democratic societies as not to constitute 
“deprivations” for the purposes of section 25(1). This is not a matter which I need to 
decide for the purposes of this case, and it may be left open for further consideration 
in future.’ 
Taking her separate judgement into account, one could argue that the suspension of 
personal and real rights by a practitioner is so “trivial”, that it does not constitute deprivation 
due to the temporary nature thereof. I am not entirely convinced of this argument and submit 
that the far reaching implication of suspension of personal rights, and by extension real rights, 
and the complex nature of the incorporeal rights concerned would not render the suspension 
trivial. Although the deprivation is temporary, it still does not change the fact that the rights 
have been insignificantly interfered with. The suspension of the rights means a creditor does 
not enjoy all the incidents attached to ownership while the suspension is in place. The 
creditor in this instance might as well be completely divested of the rights. The temporary 
nature of the deprivation being used in the enquiry to determine deprivation is better suited 
for corporeal and not incorporable property. This is because incorporeal property by its nature 
can only be significantly interfered with or limited in the intangible sense, rendering any 
interference significant or any limitation going beyond normal restrictions on property use or 
enjoyment. 
However, for now the suspension of rights is one such case which is left open for 
further consideration when or if section 136(2)(a) is challenged in court. For our current 
purposes, the suspension of personal and real rights by a practitioner could deprive a creditor 
of property. The issue as to the temporary nature of the suspension of the rights will play 
more of an important factor in the determination of whether the deprivation is arbitrary or 
not. 
6.6 Arbitrary Deprivation in Terms of the Property Clause. 
Once it is accepted that a person is deprived of property in terms of the Constitution, the next 
step is to determine whether the deprivation is arbitrary. State interference with private rights 
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in property is unavoidable and such interference may sometimes be permissible, provided 
that the interference is within the confines of law.
319
 Deprivation of property is allowed only 
in so far as the deprivation is in accordance with the property clause,
320
 which states that 
deprivation must not be arbitrary. 
The matter of First National Bank laid the foundation in determining whether 
deprivation of property is arbitrary. When Ackermann J pronounced on the issue arbitrariness 
he began by determining what is meant by the term ‘arbitrary’ in section 25(1), holding that 
the meaning of the word was dependent on its statutory context,
321
 which is not limited to 
there being no rational connection between means and ends.
322
 It refers to a wider concept 
and a broader principle that is more demanding than an enquiry into mere rationality.
323
 With 
this in mind, Ackermann J, at 66, held that:  
‘[i]t is important in every case in which section 25(1) is in issue to have regard to the 
legislative context to which the prohibition against “arbitrary” deprivation has to be 
applied; and also to the nature and extent of the deprivation. In certain circumstances 
the legislative deprivation might be such that no more than a rational connection 
between means and ends would be required, while in others the ends would have to be 
more compelling to prevent the deprivation from being arbitrary.’ 
One ought to have a look at the purpose of a particular provision in question to 
determine the reason for the deprivation. When the reason for the deprivation is known, it can 
then be determined whether the deprivation is arbitrary. When a challenged provision does 
not provide sufficient reason for deprivation or is procedurally unfair, then it is arbitrary 
deprivation.
324
 
Sufficient reason is the determining factor in deciding whether a challenged provision 
arbitrary deprives a person of property. Ackermann J, at 100, held that sufficient reason is 
established by having regard to:  
‘(a) ...the relationship between means employed,...namely the deprivation…and ends 
sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question. 
(b)…[the] complexity of relationships... 
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(c)…the relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose 
property is affected. 
(d)…the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the 
property as well as the extent of the deprivation in respect of such property…’ 
Generally speaking, where the deprivation in question is ownership of land or a corporeal 
movable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established, than in the case of 
incorporeal property.
325
 When the deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of 
ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling than when the 
deprivation embraces only some partial interest of ownership.
326
 There may also be 
circumstances when sufficient reason is established by no more than a mere rational 
relationship between means and ends,
327
 but whether there is sufficient reason for deprivation 
is a matter to be decided on a case by case basis.
328
 
From this it is evident that the purpose of the law is important. The deprivation has to 
link with the purpose of the law in order for there to be ‘sufficient’ reason to deprive a person 
of property and if there is no such reason, then the deprivation is arbitrary. 
How the Constitutional Court applied the sufficient reason principle is best illustrated 
by looking at the First National Bank and Mkontwana matters together, both of which related 
to challenged provisions that deprived people of property. The challenged provision in First 
National Bank permanently deprived an owner of property so that the state can recover tax 
owed by someone else other than the owner. On the other hand, the challenged provision in 
Mkontwana temporarily deprived a person from transferring property, while there was 
outstanding municipality rates charged on the property. The matters differed fundamentally 
with regards to the connection between the deprivation and the purpose of the law. In the 
First National Bank case, the connection between the purpose of the challenged provision 
and the property and its owner was far removed and Yacoob J in Mkontwana observed this. 
He held, at 35-35, that:  
‘[i]f the purpose of the law bears no relation to the property and its owner, the 
provision is arbitrary. The customs law in issue in the FNB case fell into this category. 
It permitted total deprivation of property even when the customs debt bore no 
relationship either to the owner or to the property itself. The FNB judgment also sets 
out the approach to be adopted if there is a connection between the purpose of the 
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deprivation and the property or its owner. In these circumstances, there must be 
sufficient reason for the deprivation otherwise the deprivation is arbitrary. The nature 
of the relationship between means and ends that must exist to satisfy the section 25(1) 
rationality requirement depends on the nature of the affected property and the extent 
of the deprivation. A mere rational connection between means and ends could be 
sufficient reason for a minimal deprivation. However, the greater the extent of the 
deprivation the more compelling the purpose and the closer the relationship between 
means and ends must be.’ 
Therefore, the court in First National Bank looked at a connection between the 
purpose of the law and the property or its owner, finding that the purpose bore no relation to 
either the owner or the property itself and thus the deprivation was arbitrary. In certain 
instances, there can be a connection between the deprivation and the property or its owner, 
and as such the arbitrary enquiry will be approached from that perspective. Yacoob J in 
Mkontwana, at 44, held that sufficient reason in instances of connection between the purpose 
of deprivation and the property or its owner will be determined having regard to:  
‘(a) the nature of the property concerned and the extent of the deprivation; 
 (b) the nature of the means-ends relationship that is required in the light of the nature 
and extent of the deprivation; and 
(c) whether the relationship between means and ends accords with what is appropriate 
in the circumstances and whether it constitutes sufficient reason for the section 25(1) 
deprivation.’ 
The Constitutional Court in Mkontwana was concerned with the nature of deprivation which 
was a single incident of ownership and the extent of deprivation which was temporary. 
6.6.1 Is the deprivation of property in terms of section 136(2)(a) arbitrary?  
6.6.1.1 Purpose of the suspension  
The starting point, in determining whether deprivation of property rights of a creditor is 
arbitrary, is to establish the purpose of the deprivation or rather the purpose for the 
suspension. The power of a practitioner to suspend any obligation of a company can only be 
exercised during business rescue proceedings and it follows that the purpose of business 
rescue is ultimately the purpose of the suspension.  
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Business rescue constitutes a major theme in the Companies Act of 2008
329
 and the 
purpose of business rescue forms part of the overall purpose of the Act. Section 7(k) of the 
Act stipulates that its purpose, in relation to business rescue, is to:  
‘provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a 
manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders…’ 
At first glance, the purpose of the Act in relation to business rescue seems to be for the rescue 
and recovery of an otherwise financially distressed company for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. Who these stakeholders are includes creditors, shareholders and employees.
330
 
There thus appears to be a stakeholder approach, which takes into account public interests. In 
Koen and v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd
331
 Binns-Ward J, at 14, 
commented that:  
‘It is clear that the legislature has recognised that the liquidation of 
companies…occasions significant collateral damage, both economically and 
socially...It is obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such adverse 
socio-economic consequences should be avoided where…possible. Business rescue is 
intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed at 
avoiding…liquidations in cases in which there is a reasonable prospect of salvaging 
the…company…, or of securing a better return to creditors...’ 
Section 128(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008 defines business rescue to mean 
proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed by 
providing for:  
‘(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its affairs, 
business and property;  
(ii) a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company…; and  
(iii) the development and implementation…of a plan to rescue the company by 
restructuring its…debt and other liabilities…in a manner that maximises the 
likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or…results in a 
better return for the company’s creditors…than would result from the immediate 
liquidation of the company…’ 
In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd,
332
 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that a business rescue plan contemplates two objectives: the 
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primary one being to facilitate the continued existence of an insolvent company to solvency, 
and the secondary one to facilitate a better return for the creditors or shareholders of the 
company than would result from immediate liquidation.
333
 The achievement of either of the 
two objectives qualifies as business rescue.
334
 Therefore, although section 7(k) implicitly 
provides that the purpose of business rescue is to rescue and recover financially distressed 
companies, the facilitation of a better return for creditors or shareholders of the company also 
forms part of the purpose of business rescue. 
6.6.1.2 Connection between the suspension and the purpose of the suspension. 
There is a clear connection between the suspension of any obligation during business rescue 
and the intended purpose. In order to have the desired purpose, the suspension of the 
obligation has to take place. We have said that if the purpose of a challenged provision bore 
no relation to either the owner or the property itself, the deprivation is outright arbitrary. With 
regard to the connection between the purpose and the owner of the property, specifically 
creditors, the provision is aimed at enabling them to either retain their claim when the 
company returns to solvency or provide a better return on their claim than they would 
otherwise have had when the company is placed in liquidation. 
The other connective relationship is between the purpose of section 136(2)(a) and the 
rights themselves. Personal rights in their nature are such that only the holder can enforce 
them against someone else. As such, personal rights will always be attached to the owner 
thereof. The purpose of section 136(2)(a) relating to a creditor as the owner will as a 
consequence relate to the personal rights themselves. On the other hand, the limited real 
rights flowing from a mortgage bond are in relation to the secured property, but their 
continued existence depends of the continued existence of the debt which is the basis of the 
personal rights. Again, therefore, any purpose relating to the secured creditor as the owner 
will as a consequence relate of the limited real rights themselves. Over and beyond this, the 
purpose of enabling a creditor to retain the claim or get a better return on the claim on 
liquidation will be achieved by suspending the very same rights. From that perspective alone 
there is a connection between the purpose of section 136(2)(a) and the deprivation. 
Therefore, having regards to the purpose of section 136(2)(a), it can be seen that its purpose 
does have relation to both creditors and theirs rights. 
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Where there is a connection between the purpose of the deprivation and the property 
or its owner, the arbitrary enquiry will be approached from that connective perspective and 
this is the case here. As such, to establish whether there is sufficient reason for the 
deprivation, we must look at the nature of the rights and the extent of the suspension. We 
must then look at the means-ends relationship in the light thereof to determine whether such 
means-ends relationship is appropriate in the circumstances. 
Turning to the nature of the rights – if deprivation affects all the incidents of 
ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling than when the 
deprivation embraces only some partial interest of ownership. The nature of the rights in 
question is that they are incorporeal property. The suspension of the rights temporarily 
deprives a creditor of all the use and enjoyment of the rights. However, the provision does not 
seem to bar a creditor from ceding away these rights, and ownership on suspension still rests 
with the creditor. Whether any person would pay for any suspended rights in a financially 
distressed company is another issue together. Because the suspension of the rights does not 
strip a creditor of ownership in those rights, the purpose of the deprivation is less compelling. 
As to the extent of deprivation – the greater the extent of deprivation, the more 
compelling the purpose for deprivation will have to be than when the deprivation is lesser in 
extent. A practitioner can only suspend the rights without leave of court, so the deprivation is 
temporary. As was mentioned before, O’Regan J remarked that the temporary nature of 
deprivation may in future be relevant for the purpose of the deprivation inquiry itself. 
However, as the law stands the temporary nature of the deprivation is relevant to the 
arbitrariness inquiry. In this regard, the temporary nature of the suspension could be the 
decisive factor in determining whether section 136(2)(a) arbitrarily deprives creditors of their 
rights. Again, because the suspension of the rights is temporary, the purpose of the 
deprivation is less compelling. 
Now we must look at the means-ends relationship in the light of the nature of the 
rights and extent of the suspension to determine whether such means-ends relationship is 
appropriate in the circumstances. The means of the deprivation is of course the suspension of 
the rights. The intended end result of this deprivation, in relation to creditors, is to either 
retain their claim when the company returns to solvency, or provide a better return on their 
claim than they would otherwise have had when the company is placed in liquidation. The 
end result is to benefit creditors to which the very rights may be suspended. The deprivation 
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is achieved by not completely depriving creditors of ownership in the rights, and moreover 
the deprivation is temporary. If it were not be for the suspension of these rights, the ability of 
a company to return to solvency or the ability to provide a better return of claims on 
insolvency would be less probable. As such, it is submitted that the mean-ends relationship 
seems to be appropriate in the circumstances.  
Having regard to all of the above, it is submitted that the suspension of rights of a 
creditor is not arbitrary in instances where a practitioner suspends any obligation of a 
company during business rescue. 
6.7 Limitation Clause 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic, taking into account all relevant factors.
335
 The standard 
set in the property clause in the determination of the constitutionality of a challenged 
provision is arbitrariness. While on the other hand, the standard set in the limitation clause is 
reasonableness and justifiability.
336
 This appears to be separate requirements for both the 
limitation and property clause, and it can be argued that deprivation of property should 
comply with the requirements of both clauses. In First National Bank of SA Ackermann J, at 
70, held that he:  
‘…cannot support the suggestion…that deprivations may have to comply with both 
the requirements of section 25 and the general requirements of section 36. If the 
deprivation is not arbitrary, the section 25(1) right is not limited and the question of 
justification under section 36 does not arise.’ 
It is submitted that the suspension of a creditor’s rights by a practitioner is not 
arbitrary and, therefore, the question of justification under the limitation clause does not arise. 
If it had been found that the suspension of a creditor’s rights is arbitrary, then perhaps:  
‘[i]t might be contended that once the deprivation has been adjudged to be arbitrary, 
no scope remains for justification under section 36. By its terms, section 36 of the 
Constitution draws no distinction between any rights in the Bill of Rights…Neither 
the text nor purpose of section 36 suggests that any right in the Bill of Rights is 
excluded from limitation under its provisions…It will be assumed, without deciding, 
                                                          
335
 Factors including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature 
and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose. 
336
 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; 
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance supra (n297) at 65. 
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that an infringement of section 25(1) of the Constitution is subject to the provisions of 
section 36.’
337
 
It could be that the limitation clause will apply in instances of arbitrary deprivation of 
property but, because it is submitted that this is not the case here, it is not necessary to 
consider whether a deprivation which is arbitrary may nevertheless be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause.
338
 Such an inquiry is, in any event, likely to lead to duplication of the 
enquiries, which may ultimately yield the same results. 
  
                                                          
337
 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; 
First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance supra (n297) at 110. 
338
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government & Housing in the Province of Gauteng supra 
(n308) at 125. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Conclusive Remarks of Each Chapter  
7.1.1 Chapter 2: Our Deeds Registry System  
It was intended in this chapter to get a deep understand of our registration system, so that it 
can be determined whether a practitioner’s power can legally extend to real rights. An 
understanding of our registration systems indicates that the nature, effect, purpose and 
function of our registration system entails that registration is required for the creation, 
transfer and termination of all real rights in immovable property. It therefore logically follows 
that registration should be required for “suspension” of real rights. 
7.1.2 Chapter 3: Defining and Distinguishing between Personal Rights a d Real Rights 
There are clear differences between rights in a loan agreement and rights in a mortgage bond. 
A burden that imposes an obligation on a debtor in favour of a creditor is a personal right in 
the hands of a creditor and a burden that imposes an obligation on land is a real right. Where 
a mortgage bond is registered, the obligation imposed on the land is born from the obligation 
imposed by the owner personally. Although this is the case, personal and real rights are 
separate and distinct from one another. However, such rights depend on each other to exist. 
7.1.3 Chapter 4: Critical Analysis of a Mortgage Bond 
It has been seen that limited real rights in a mortgage bond vest only on registration, which 
such rights are ancillary in nature and cannot be separated from the underlying claim. As a 
result, anything legally affecting the underlying claim has legal effect on the ancillary limited 
real rights. 
7.1.4 Chapter 5: The Extent of the Business Rescue Practitioner’s Power to Suspend Rights 
A practitioner has the power to suspend personal rights in a loan agreement, such power 
extending to limited real rights in a mortgage bond. As such and due to the nature of our 
registration system, the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 should perhaps be amended to include 
an act of registration to note the suspension of limited real rights. 
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7.1.5 Chapter 6: The Right to Property 
The property clause is clear that no one may be deprived of property, except in terms of the 
law of general application that does not allow arbitrary deprivation of property. Section 
136(2)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008 is a law of general application, which enables a 
practitioner to suspend rights of a creditor. The rights so suspended appear to be property 
rights worthy of constitutional protection, and by suspending them a practitioner deprives 
creditors of their property rights. The deprivation is however not arbitrary, because there is 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. As such, it would appear that section 136(2)(a) does not 
offend the property clause. 
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